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ABSTRACT
This thesis attempts to document the events,
environment, decisions, and personnel involved in the
development, implementation and life cycle management of a
computer software application. The computer application is
developed using a prototyping methodology and a third
generation software language for a Department of the Navy
Headquarters Command.
The data are presented in a case study format and are
analyzed in accordance with software life cycle development
principles and change management principles. The case
methodology was considered the most applicable tool to
showcase the complexity of decisions and processes of
computer systems management. The case studies demonstrate
the importance of adhering to proven software development
principles throughout he life cycle management of a
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This thesis is an effort to document the events,
environment and personnel involved in the development,
implementation and life cycle management of a computer
software application. Also documented is the maturation
process of the organization responsible for the computer
application. The data are presented in the format of six
case studies which cover a period of two years, and are
analyzed in accordance with software development life cycle
management principles and change management principles.
B. METHODOLOGY
A case study is a description of a real situation that
occurred in a real organization [Ref. l:p. 108]. Data
pcrtaining to the industry, environment, organization,
product, and personnel involved in the situation are
presented. The focus or purpose of a case study is on one
or several key issues, decisions, or problems requiring a
solution. The focus of this case study is on decisions
pertaining to development of computer software and the
consequences of these decisions on the software and the
cognizant organizations over a period of time. A case study
is an effective method for presenting valuable insight into
the constant technological change and innovation
1
characteristics of the computer systems management field and
their effects on management and organizational change [Ref.
2:p. 370].
The data within a case study are presented not just from
one person's point of view, but rather by taking into
account as many different views on a situation as possible.
Data are presented in chronological sequence and interwoven
into a narrative format. The narrative format facilitates
the search for facts, questions, and probable explanations
for the situation presente by the case.
The data, covering two years of the life cycle of the
computer application, we: voluminous. Sources utilized
were written documentation, interview and direct
observation. Presentation of the data in a chronological
sequence was the only way to do justice to the rich
description of all the factors which played a part in the
decisions, personnel actions, and the environment of the
computer application. This methodology also allows for
presentation of the entire range of details and processes
surrounding a situation.
C. BACKGROUND
The computer application documented is the Officer
Assignment Information System (OAIS). This application is
used by Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC) for
assignment of Naval Officers. The purpose of OAIS is as a
tool to facilitate and improve the officer assignment
2
process. OAIS is a menu-driven, online, real-time
application run on an IBM 4381 mainframe computer. Each
user has a remote display terminal and keyboard connected
via a local area network to a mainframe. Personnel
information, activity billets and automatic orderwriting is
provided. A batch mode is used for system maintenance,
updating of files and production of large reports.
Development of OAIS took place in the early 1980's. A
prototyping development methodology and a third generation
software language were chosen for developing OAIS. At this
time, prototyping was on the leading edge of technology. By
using prototyping, NMPC hoped that problems concerning cost
overruns, schedule delays, and applications not meeting user
requirements, problems which characterized the current state
of the software development industry, would be avoided.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Two items are of particular interest in this thesis.
The first question addresses what could have been done to
alleviate, or prevent, problems encountered with OAIS
implementation efforts. The second a'estion addresses
explanations for problems encountered in OAIS implementation
efforts. The information systems department at NMPC is
currently preparing for a redesign of OAIS into a database
system. The command is interested in identification of any
lessons learned from prior OAIS implementations and any
possible problems that can be anticipated. Of particular
3
concern for NMPC is identification of any long-term effects
resulting from implementation of the prototype.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
Following this introductory chapter, the thesis is
organized into four chapters and two appendixes. Chapter II
describes the case methodology, its advantages and relevance
as both a research and teaching strategy. Chapter III
contains the six case studies documenting the development,
implementation and life cycle management of OAIS. Chapter
IV is an analysis of each case study within the case series.
The analysis is focussed on software development life cycle
principles and management of change. Chapter V contains
responses, conclusions, and recommendations in accordance
with the stated research questions. Appendix A contains a
description of OAIS software interfaces with other computer
applications. Appendix B contains timelines and lists of
personnel. The timelines document significant events during
OAIS development and implementation. This documentation can
be of assistance to both case study students and





This chapter addresses the case methodology. The
advantages and drawbacks of a case study in comparison with
other research methods are Ciscu.ssed. The use and benefits
of a case study for both research and teaching purposes also
are explored.
B. CASE STUDY FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES
A definition of a case study for research purposes is as
follows:
A case study is an empirical inquiry that
- investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its
real life context; when
- the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not
clearly evident; and
- multiple sources of evidence are used. [Ref. 3:p.
23]
In this definition, case study research stands on its
own as a research strategy. Prior to this definition, a
common misconception held by those uneducated in case
methodology was that research strategies were of a
hierarchial nature [Ref. 3:p. 15]. Case studies were
considered as being at the bottom part of the hierarchy.
Their use was for the most part a preliminary to other types
of research. Consequently, case study usage was primarily
limited to the exploratory stage of research. Also case
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studies were viewed as consisting of only one small part of
the above definition, that of investigating a contemporary
phenomenon within its real life context. This is evident
when case studies are just used to analyze decisions,
processes or events. [Ref. 3:p. 23]
Views on conducting research have evolved to a point
that each different type of research strategy is viewed as
"a different way of collecting and analyzing empirical
evidence." [Ref. 3:p. 15] These views have evolved from
the narrow niche given to case studies and the wide,
prescriptive view given to experiments. Recognition of the
best type of research strategy is now based on subject
matter and research purposes. Researchers in a
"traditional" sense, where emphasis is on quantitative,
controlled events and results that are generalizable and
replicable have recognized the benefits derivable from case
research. Each type of research strategy can be used for
each of the three different purposes of research;
exploratory, descriptive or explanatory. Which strategy is
used depends on the following three conditions: (1) type of
research question; (2) extent of control over behavioral
events; (3) focus on contemporary or historical events [Ref.
3:p. 16].
The five recognized research strategies within the
social sciences are experiment, survey, archival analysis,
history and case study. Experiments, history and case
6
studies are research strategies that apply to a "how" or
"why" type of research question. Experiments focus on
contemporary phenomena, but require control over behavioral
events. History does not focus on contemporary phenomena
and also does not require control over behavioral events.
As previously defined, a case study focuses on contemporary
phenomena in which there is no control over behavioral
events. The only difference between history and case study
research strategies, besides the focus of the research, past
versus present, is that case study researchers have an
advantage of adding direct observation and interviews to
their research methodology. [Ref. 3:p. 19]
C. ADVANTAGES OF CASE STUDIES
"As a research endeavor, the case study contributes
uniquely to our knowledge of individual, organizational,
social and political phenomena." [Ref. 3:p. 14] New
situations, interactions and problems occur every day. Case
studies provide for a description of "holistic and
meaningful characteristics of such real life events as
individual life cycles, organization and managerial
processes, neighborhood change, international relations, and
maturation of industries." [Ref. 3:p. 14]
A unique strength of case study research is its ability
to utilize multiple sources of evidence in presenting data
[Ref. 3:p. 20]. Such evidence includes documents,
artifacts, interviews and observations. This characteristic
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enables presentation of data from all points of view and
perception. Rarely does one view of a situation contain all
the pertinent facts contributing to a situation. By having
access to multiple sources of evidence, the full story or
explanation is easier to piece together. Case study
research allows a showcasing of cause and effect factors of
a situation or problem. With the active observation of a
case study researcher, many details are provided in addition
to available written docu.,entation. This facilitates an
ability to document the pc ible causes and effects in a
relationship.
Another advantage to le case study method can be found
in the use of qualitative data. Qualitative data is in the
form of words, not the numbers traditionally relied on.
Qualitative data does have some advantages over quantitative
data. Qualitative data are a "source of well-grounded, rich
descriptions and explanations of processes occurring in
local contexts." [Ref. 4:p. 15] Words gleamed from
interviews, observations and documentation can indicate
people's attitudes, internal relations among personnel and
relative power and influence within an organization [Ref.
5:p. 49]. Words possess a quality of "undeniability" about
them [Ref. 4:p. 15]. "Words, organized into incidents/
stories provide a concrete, vivid, meaningful flavor that
often proves far more convincing to a reader... than a page
of numbers." [Ref. 4:p. 15]
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D. DISADVANTAGES OF CASE STUDIES
A major difficulty contributing to acceptance of the
case study as a significant research strategy is that the
data gathered and analyzed are qualitative in nature.
"Numbers don't lie" is a popular cliche in support of
quantitative data. This negative viewpoint is based
primarily on two factors. One factor is that words can have
a variety of meanings. The interpretation given to them by
the researcher is viewed as a possibility for bias. The
numbers faction prefers experiments where there is control
over events and the results, in the form of numbers, are
interpreted the same by all analysts. There can be no bias
in the interpretation of numbers. Secondly, there is a
preference for being able to conltrol events which brings up
the question of replicability. Would another person viewing
the qualitative data of a case study come up with the same
conclusions? Would another researcher be able to replicate
the entire case study from data gathering through analysis?
"Observations tend to be unique and non-replicable." [Ref.
6:p. 2] The question concerning the replicability of a case
study adds a degree of uncertainty to the research process
[R;f. 4:p. 16].
Additional uncertainty also comes from lack of detail in
the documentation that case study researchers provide on
their methodology. Some past case study results have been
found to be influenced/ biased by the researcher. A
9
contributing factor to this lack of documentation is the
lack of accepted and standardized methods for qualitative
data analysis, and a lack of a common language. [Ref. 4:p.
16]
There are several other drawbacks to the case
methodology. The preparation of case studies is time-
consuming and their documentation is voluminous. The fact
that there is little basis for scientific generalization is
also considered a major stumbling block [Ref. 3:p. 20]. A
typical skeptic of case study research, who is immersed in
the quantitative viewpoint, looks to conclusions of the
research to be generalizable to other situations. This is
not the intent of case study conclusions. "Case study
conclusions are generalizable to theoretical propositions
and not to populations or universes." [Ref. 3:p. 21] They
are not even generalizable to other organizations. "In this
sense a case study does not represent a 'sample' and the
investigators' goal is to expand and generalize theories
(analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies
(statistical generalization)." [Ref. 3:p. 21]
An example of a case study giving emphasis to a
theoretical concept is as follows: the Cuban Missile
Crisis. This exact situation will never happen again, but
there are general lessons that can be learned. These
lessons include "the management of the problem, and the role
10
of organizational routine in shaping events and decisions."
[Ref. 7:p. 295]
The case study as a research strategy has been used in
many different areas:
- policy, political science, and public administration
research;
- community psychology and sociology;
- organizational and management studies;
- city and regional planning research, such as studies of
plans, neighborhoods or public agencies. .... [Ref.
3:p. 16].
The use of case study research has also proven valuable
to the information systems area. "The information systems
area is characterized by constant technological change and
innovation." [Ref. 2:p. 370] This change and innovation
has an impact on management and organizational issues in an
information systems department. Case study research has
been able to provide valuable insights into these issues
[Ref. 2:p. 370].
E. CASE STUDIES FOR TEACHING PURPOSES
According to Dorothy Robyn, "there are two criteria
potentially present in any learning situation." [Ref. 8:p.
1] These two criteria are the content or specific knowledge
to be learned and the learning process. The learning
process concerns itself with presenting a general approach
or methodology to problem solving and decision making. A
student's knowledge and ability to deal with the reality of
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life outside the classroom is dependent on both of these
criteria. [Ref. 8:p. 1]
Case studies basically follow the principle of "learning
by doing." Case studies present real life with all of its
associated complexity. Experience with case studies
provides students with exposure to a wide range of real life
situations which could take a lifetime to experience
personally. This experience offers a basis for comparison
should the student run into the same situation outside the
classroom [Ref. 9:p. 56].
For the most part, a classroom setting presents facts
and situations which have only one right answer [Ref. 8:p.
2]. A student in a lecture/classroom environment is a
receiver of facts [Ref. 9:p. 56]. Real life deals with
situations in which not all the relevant facts of a decision
are available or in which a decision is not straightforward
in that there is no right solution. "Case studies are
valuable lessons in teaching students the habits of
diagnosing problems, analyzing and evaluating alternatives
and formulating workable plans of action." [Ref. 9:p. 56]
Additionally, students must learn that decisions are not
just made from an analysis of the facts. "The decision is a
political process...involving power and influence." [Ref.
6:p. 2]
Using case studies in learning situations provides a
student with an opportunity to apply theory to a situation
12
within the safety of a classroom environment. In essence a
case study is a "simulated experience." [Ref. l:p. 109] An
additional benefit is an ability to apply known theory to
contemporary happenings to see if a theory holds true. If
it doesn't, there is opportunity to search for reasons for a
cause and effect. Debates between students over a cause,
effect and solution to case study problems provides the
benefits of requiring them to question their assumptions and
to defend their positions on issues. Other benefits of the
use of a case study in a classroom include teaching students
the following skills: how to search for facts, choose
between alternatives, and what questions it is essential to
ask. [Ref. 8:p. 2]
Retired Navy Admiral Stansfield Turner believes strongly
in utilization of case studies in a military classroom. He
says, "Many of the education programs, are simply cramming
officers' heads with facts rather than helping them to
develop the skills to deal with difficult problems of
leadership, strategy and management." [Ref. 10:p. 1]
Admiral Turner feels that using the case study method "will
help prepare students for the time when they rise to the
level where they really have to make decisions for our
country." [Ref. 10:p. 1]
F. METHODOLOGY OF THESIS CASE STUDY
The case study series that is the subject of this thesis
concerns the chronological events of an organization during
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a period of two years. The case series describes the
maturing of an automated data processing division and its
interactions with other departments of the organization in a
Department of the Navy Headquarters Command. An
organizational case study is defined,
... where you purposely observe the entire configuration of
individuals and groups in the setting of an organization,
... and you observe events in the way that they naturally
unfold, without imposing any sort of experimental controls
or treatments whatsoever on what it is you're observing."
[Ref. 6:p. 1]
It is typical of organizational case studies to refer to
the private mental state of individuals, to the privately
held meanings that the s crounding organization has for
them and to features of the underlying social structure
none of which can be seen directly. [Ref. 6:p. 2]
A case study "treats people as the observable agents through
which the unobservable forces of the organization act."
[Ref. 6:p. 9]
The case study writer was a member of the automated data
processing division and a primary participant in the day-to-
day events that have been documented. There does exist the
possibility for bias in the writing of this case study, but
a conscious effort was made to avoid any potential for bias.
For example, observation consisted of memory recall by the
case writer and verification of observations by several of
the interviewees.
The setting of the case study is a contemporary
situation in that computers and computer systems management
is a relatively new field within the past two decades. Of
particular importance in this case study is the use of a
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prototyping methodology for the development of the computer
application and the use of a third generation software
language. The evolution of a computer application over a
two-year time period and the maturing of the organization
responsible for its development in terms of organizational
structure, policies and personnel are described. Sources of
evidence included written documentation, interview and
direct observation. The written documentation included user
and system documentation on the application, and reports on
the development of the application by contractor and in-
house personnel. Interviews were conducted primarily over
the phone with a total of 11 out of 15 of the principal
players within the organization. Personnel interviewed
covered the entire hierarchy of management, contractors,
project officer, front line supervisors and worker
personnel. A major caveat is that a few of the interviewees
are still attached to the organization. Some of their input
may have been tempered by still being involved with the
computer application. The data presented by these





A series of six case studies is presented in this
chapter. The primary theme in the case series is the
development and life cycle management of the Officer
Assignment Information System (OAIS). A secondary theme is
the maturing of an automated data processing organization.
Case study one contains the background events of OAIS
development. It describes the implementation of the OAIS
prototype and covers the timeframe of November 1982 through
October 1985. Case study two presents the events preceding
the implementation of the first major change to OAIS. These
changes are a software conversion and an enhanced order-
writing module. The time period covered is October 1985
through May 1986. Case st'idy three concerns the failure of
the new version of OAIS. Command, user and project officer
reactions to the failure are addressed. Case study four
presents the events leading up to a second try at
implementation of a new version of OAIS. Also, during this
time period of May 1986 through May 1987, the organization
responsible for OAIS development is transitioning from one
with an emphasis on development to one where production
issues are of equal importance. Case study five describes
the problems with the second implementation of the new
16
version of OAIS. Case study six describes the
organization's recovery from the problems generated from the
OAIS implementation and changes made to deal with present
and future computer systems management.
Organization charts, where applicable, are contained
within the body of the case studies. Appendix A contains a
description of OAIS interfaces. Appendix B contains
timelines and lists of NMPC-47 personnel for case studies
two, four and six. These timelines document important OAIS
and NMPC-47 events over time. 'This documentation can be
used to clarify the case studies and be used in conjunction
with the teaching notes contained in Chapter IV.
B. CASE STUDY ONE
1. Background
OAIS (Officer Assignment Information System) is the
first in a planned series of four applications which combine
to form the Naval Military Personnel Distribution System
(NMPDS). NMPDS was designed to support the Distribution
Division (NMPC-4) of the Naval Military Personnel Command
(NMPC). The mission of NMPC-4 is to assign officer and
enlisted active duty personnel in accordance with the needs
of both the Navy and the individual's career, and to control
the manning of activities as specified by the Chief of Naval
Operations. The goal of the NMPC-4 mission is to "Put the
right person in the right job at the right time."
17
2. organization
Development and production of NMPDS are the
responsibility of NMPC-47, the Distribution Support
Department. As of October 1985, NM4PC-47 was organized as
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Figure 1. NMPC-47 Organization, October 1985
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N470, was responsible for all development and production
decisions concerning OAIS, On-line Distribution Information
System (ODIS) and other systems which fell under the
umbrella of NMPDS. The data administration function,
training function, Application Programming Shop and
Information Center made up the rest of N470. The
Information Systems Support branch, N471, included Officer
and Enlisted Error Research (help desk), Systems
Administration (network hardware and software), Scheduling,
and Configuration Management. The Order Support branch,
N472, consisted of orderwriting experts and order
distribution. Scheduling was responsible for running
backups, batch updates, and daily, weekly and monthly OAIS
reports. These reports were distributed by the Order
Support branch, N472, to assignment and placement officers.
3. Background of NMPDS
NMPDS was designed to be a tool to help optimize
unit manning, minimize personnel turbulence, minimize
assignment costs, enhance individual career development,
improve personalized service to constituents, and maintain
accurate and timely personnel and distribution information.
Applicatic ithin NMPDS were planned to have the
following characteristics:
- terminal driven.
- interactive data entry and transaction oriented.
- on-line information retrieval.
19
- distributed processing oriented to functional user.
- single point of data entry.
- standardized processes.
- central control of data, resources and
telecommunications.
- modular structure for expandability and flexibility.
Two major guidelines, top management commitment and
involving the user in all phases of development were agreed
upon during the planning stages of NMPDS and would apply
throughout the NMPDS lifecycle.
4. Officer Assignment nformation System (OAIS)
OAIS automated the distribution process involved in
assignment of officers tc illets. OAIS was designed as a
tool to facilitate and improve the assignment process by
providing access to all officer distribution files through
one computer application. The application provides
information to both assignment officers (detailers) and
placement officers.
The Officer Assignment Information System (OAIS) is
a menu-driven, on-line, real-time application run on an IBM
4381 mainframe computer. Each user has a remote display
terminal and keyboard connected via a local area network to
a mainframe. By accessing either the Assignment Officer
Menu or Placement Officer Menu, personnel information,
activity billets and automatic orderwriting are provided. A
report menu is available for generation of specific reports
desired by users. A batch mode is used for system
20
maintenance, updating of files and production of large
reports.
The manual steps involved with orderwriting were
automated by OAIS. Before OAIS, orders typically took four
to five weeks to get through the chop chain once an officer-
assignment match was made. After OAIS, orders could be
generated and sent within two --u three days.
Information provided by OAIS falls into three main
categories: personnel, activity and billet. Personnel
information provided by OAIS includes: biographical,
performance evaluation, duty preferences, and career
history. Activity information provided is organization,
administrative and mission specific. Billet information
includes: billet titles, designators, subspeciality codes
and manning requirements.
The network operating system for the IBM 4381
mainframe is IBM's MVS with CICS as the basic communications
software in the multi-user environment. Communication
between terminals, printers, and the IBM 4381 mainframe was
conducted through the use of a bus local area network. The
local area network and its associated bus interface units
were owned by NMPC-16. Bus interface units are hardware and
contain eight available ports for access onto the network.
Bus interface units allowed flexibility in location and
subsequent moving of OAIS terminals within an office space.
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5. Users of OAIS
An assignment officer is responsible for the
personal and professional interests of individual officers
and assists them in pursuing their career. Placement
officers ensure that each Naval activity is optimally manned
with the best qualified officers. The job of being an
assignment officer or placement officer included a lot of
stress. There were pressures from senior officers to
conserve money and pressures from activities to get the best
officers for their command. Assignment officers spent most
of their days on the phone talking to constituents about
upcoming orders or counseling on career moves. A typical
assignment or placement officer was a Lieutenant Commander
or Commander. Often times they came from leadership
positions of executive officer equivalence. They were used
to having many people working for them. As an assignment or
placement officer they were on their own with a constantly
ringing phone and a computer application called OAIS.
Quick identification of personnel and billets coming
up for reassignment are available with OAIS. The major
piece of information that drives the reassignment
(availability) process is the Projected Rotation Date (PRD).
Every active duty officer has a PRD assigned upon
arrival at a new duty station. Depending on location and
type of job, this PRD ranges from 12 to 36 months. The
assignment officer will begin looking for billets for
22
personnel with PRD's six to nine months in the future. The
placement officer is also looking at filling the billets
made vacant on PRD's and advertises billets that will be
coming available. Once the best officer-billet match has
been determined by the assignment officer, OAIS facilitates
the officer-billet match approval process and orderwriting
process. The approval process ..onsists of an automated chop
chain which routes the proposed officer-billet miatch through
the appropriate personnel. The automated chop chain
facilitates expediency and comnmunication between the
assignment and placemeiit officers. The orderwriting process
includes decisions on training (what, where, how long) and
costing of orders. The information necessary for this
portion of the process was automated, replacing paper charts
and schedules.
Improvements were made by OAIS in three categories:
data accuracy, naval resource utilization and officer
morale. Improved data accuracy resulted from automation of
previously manually maintained distribution information.
Improved naval resource utilization resulted from having
billet assignments made from a larger pool of candidates,
decreased incidence of inaccurate reporting instructions on
PCS moves and misassignments. Improved officer morale
resulted primarily from a reduction in the amount of time
required for the assignment process.
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6. Software Development
OAIS software was developed using a prototype
methodology and a language called Application Productivity
Systems (APS)COBOL. APSCOBOL was developed by SAGE Federal
Systems. It is a third generation software language
designed tco produce COBOL code very quickly. Application
generators are used to produce source code from high level
specifications, reduce programming of certain system
functions and enable junior programmers to produce
sophisticated code with little training. Additional
benefits of APSCOBOL were its advertised transportability
between various types of hardware and its upwardly
compatible design. Other software tools used during
development were screen painters which assisted in
configuration of data entry screens and report generators
which facilitated access to specific data from files for
generating reports.
The current instructions regarding development of
information systems did not include prototyping as a
methodology. Events which took place during OAIS
development were matched as closely as possible with the
Life Cycle Management Milestones which was directed under
current software development instructions.
When the OAIS project was first established, the
hardware on which the application operated was leased. This
decision was due to a necessity of proving the quality and
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efficiency of OAIS and subsequently NMPDS before additional
resources were expended. Also, the procurement process for
the hardware was not completed and management was not sure
exactly what type of hardware would be contained in the
final contract.
The benefit of an upwardly compatible design was
that in subsequent revisions to the software code, only
minor changes would be required to change over to a new
version. The compatibility feature was part of SAGE's
design architecture.
The initial version of APSCOBOL was JK, with the
next version called one point seven (1.7). When NMPC
procured APSCOBOL, it was not yet available commercially.
NMPC was able to get a good deal on the price and be on the
leading edge of technology. A prototype approach was used
for a variety of reasons. One was the necessity of
automating the assignment process as quickly as possible. A
study group had been studying the assignment process problem
since 1978. A prototype approach also would assist in
determining just what OAIS was to do by giving users a
concrete example to illustrate their ideas and requirements
on. The criginal version of OAIS was just automation of the
manual officer assignment process for the Surface
Distribution Department.
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7. implementation of OAIS
Development and implementation of OAIS was done in a
modular fashion. In November 1982, the Surface detailers
(NMPC-41) were used to test and modify the pilot prototype.
When time came to take the tested and approved prototype and
complete the design and development process, the Surface
detailers had become so dependent on OAIS that the decision
was made by NMPC-47 to implement the prototype. Over the
next 18 months the other officer oriented departments of the








Figure 2. N?4PC-4 Organization
26
Implementation of OAIS throughout the Distribution
Division was done in a modular fashion for a variety of
reasons. Among these were the original strategic plan of
development and implementation in a modular fashion,
problems with hardware acquisition and the need for minor
modification cf OAIS to accommodate each different
department. A prime 750 mainframe computer, which is non-
IBM compatible, was initially leased to run OAIS. Next, an
IBM 4341 was leased until inhouse hardware was procured.
During this period, 1982-1985, the scope and capabilities of
OAIS could not be expanded to satisfy more users.
Assignment and placement officers' way of doing
business was drastically changed by OAIS. Terminals
replaced paper passed from desk to desk. Secretarial jobs
changed from being purely clerical to a required interaction
with a computer and computer--driven reports and processes.
Even though OAIS was available on every desk, many personnel
did not initially use the computer application. Reasons for
non-use by the assignment and placement officers ranged from
being afraid of the computer, to already using another
personally-owned computer system, to being stuck in the old
ways of having their secretaries do the clerical work on the
computer while they planned in a manual mode. The Medical
Department, within NMPC-44, was one of the divisions using
personally-owned computers. They had set up files on their
constituents using a database system. This system worked
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fine until the assignment officers transferred and took
their computers with them. Mrs. Clancey, a secretary in
NMPC-44, refused to turn on the computer. She continued to
use her manual methods.
In the Submarine Department, OAIS was utilized far
more than in other recently implemented departments. This
was due to the top management commitment of the Submarine
Department. These personnel came from a technical
background and did not fear the computer coming into their
workplace. Due to their bosses' support of OAIS, all the
personnel within the department were soon proficient on
OAIS.
Placement officers were one of the last groups of
users to climb onboard the OAIS bandwagon. Before OAIS,
placement officers maintained their personnel lists on a
manual slate with a strip of paper for each officer in each
billet at an activity. In one glance they could determine a
status of their billets at any activity With OAIS being
constrained by the number of lines per screen, an entire
activity could not fit onto one screen. In the eyes of a
placement officer, this was a major drawback to the
application. Until the orderwriting process was automated
in 1985, there was really no benefit to them to using OAIS.
8. User Representatives
Each officer distribution department was represented
by a user representative, selected by the department head.
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This user representative was supposed to be experienced with
OAIS usage and functions. The responsibilities of user
representatives included attendance at OAIS user meetings,
reporting back to their department issues of the OAIS user
meetings, and bringing problems of the department to the
meeting. Also, any suggested enhancements to OAIS from
individual departments were to be routed to their respective
user representative for review. It was the responsibility
of a user representative to pass OAIS information around the
department, so that each individual OAIS user was not
calling the help desk.
9. Training
The importance of training was discovered in
parallel with the expansion of GAIS users to the Submarine
and Aviation communities. Training had not been a problem
with the Surface Department due to their daily involvemen'
with development. Their sense of ownership of OAIS promoted
self-training. CDR Hazel was brought on-board in July 1984
to be the Training Officer and to design a training program
and OAIS User Manual. CDR Hazel became the resident
functional expert on OAIS and on the specific needs of
assignment and placement officers. The Training Development
Project was established. A contract was arranged with Oak
Ridge Associated Universities in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to
develop computer-aided training. This training would serve
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OAIS, and ODIS users, who were figured to number in the
hundreds.
10. Documentation
Due to budget constraints, the push for software
development and implementation of the prototype, there was a
significant lack of operational and requirements
documentation on OAIS. Original documentation provided by
the contractor was of poor quality. There were no detailed
requirements documents. The majority of the documentation
was contained within the comment portion of the code. The
first user's manual was published in January 1985. Planning
documents included functional descriptions for OAIS and
NMPDS, operational requirements for OAIS, system
specifications for OAIS, conceptual design for OAIS, program
specifications OAIS and data base specifications for NMPDS.
C. CASE STUDY TWO
1. Background
The Officer Assignment Information System (OAIS)
which is used by the assignment and placement officers at
Naval Military Personnel Command has been operational for
three years. The organization responsible for OAIS is on
the brink of many changes: personnel, software and hard-
ware. The personnel responsible for planning and bringing
the OAIS concept to reality in NMPC-47 and at the contractor
are leaving. A new project officer is taking over at a time
when the first major software change to OAIS is in progress.
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The first of four IBM mainframe computers, an IBM 4381, has
been delivered after an exceedingly long procurement period.
2. New OAIS Project Officer, October 1985
LT Hopkins arrived at NMPC to be the OAIS Project
Officer. She had just graduated from the Naval Postgraduate
School with a Master's Degree in Computer Systems
Management. She relieved CDR Zeke who was the initial
project officer for the OAIS project. CDR Zeke had been
responsible for the growth and maturation of OAIS. He had
seen it grow from a fledgling system with 50 users in 1982
to a powerful system upon which NMPC assignment and
placement officers were now heavily dependent. OAIS users
numbered approximately 300.
The mindset of the project officers when LT Hopkins
arrived concerning the contractor, SAGE, was, "We are paying
big bucks for a quality product." The contractors were
taken at their word concerning all aspects of system
development and production and they had been proven correct
in the past.
The contracting and budget portions of the job were
a particular difficulty for LT Hopkins. The primary
contractor for OAIS was Oak Ridge National Laboratory
(ORNL), a division of the Department of Energy. The
contract with ORNL was a research and development contract.
There was not much substance nor specifically spelled out
deliverables. The emphasis was on the research and
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development of the prototyping methodology. SAGE were sub-
contractors of ORNL. In order to get contracting changes
through to ORNL, approval was required by the Total Force
Automated Systems Department (NMPC-16). NMPC-16 was
responsible for all automated data processing programs and
related support. Since OAIS was now three years old, they
viewed contracting charges in terms of maintenance and as
they conformed with the Life Cycle Milestone methodology.
3. Personnel
The majority of 01S history and expertise existed
in the brains of CDR Zeke and the project manager at SAGE.
When the poor quality dor-mentation was delivered by SAGE,
CDR Zeke said, "Don't worry about it, we know what we are
doing." When LT Hopkins relieved CDR Zeke, the project
manager at SAGE transferred to another project. The
personnel left within NMPC-47, familiar with OAIS history
and its evolution were Mr. Smith, the Technical Director and
the two branch heads, CDR Rice and CDR Cinder. CDR Rice and
CDR Cinder had been on-board less than a year.
Besides CDR Zeke, the other major player in the
evolution of OAIS was CAPT Dennis. CAPT Dennis had been the
NMPC-47 Department Head from 1983 to August 1985. CAPT
Williams had just recently relieved him.
CDR Hazel, the current Training Officer, was offered
the job of OAIS Project Officer before LT Hopkins reported
aboard. He turned it down as it was described as a
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caretaker job and CDR Hazel always enjoyed a challenge. LT
Hopkins was informed of CDR Hazel's expertise by CDR Zeke
and he recommended that she utilize CDR Hazel's knowledge.
LT Hopkins kept to herself and did not try and make
the acquaintance of her fellow officers within the
department.
LT Perkins reported on-board in December 1985. She
was designated as the replacement for CDR Hazel, who was
moving up to be the Order Support branch head. CDR Hazel
left LT Perkins alone with OAIS for two weeks while on
vacation. With his assistance on orderwriting procedures,
LT Peikins became a functional OAIS expert second only to
CDR Hazel. CDR Hazel and LT Perkins became good friends.
CDR Griffin reported on-board in April 1986. He had
just graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School and was to
be the branch head of Information Systems Support. See
Figure 3.
4. NMPC-47 Organization
CDR Rice and CDR Cinder had worked out an informal
matrix management plan for accomplishment of OAIS taskings
within NMPC-47. Programming expertise existed and was being
nurtured in the Applicatiun Programming Shop of the
Information Systems Development branch. The original plans
for OAIS called for SAGE to create the first version of OAIS
and for the Navy to take over maintenance of the project.
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Figure 3. NMPC-47 Organization, may 1986
Shop was being expanded by adding experienced Data
Processing Technicians (DP's). Expertise on the external
programs with which OAIS interfaced, existed in the
Information Systems Support branch, N471, in the Officer
Error Research section. Officer Error Research also handled
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users' problems concerning AUTONOM rejects and tracking the
status of officer orders. Hardware and systems software
expertise was also contained within the Information Systems
Support branch, in the Systems Administration section.
When LT Hopkins needed assistance or technical
advice, she went to the experts within the matrix. Quite
often, personnel in the Information Systems Support branch
were tasked by LT Hopkins without their supervisors being
aware of it. LT Hopkins was under pressure and her approach
to her problems was blunt and aggressive. She would
approach enlisted personnel and fellow officers with, "I
want this done now."
Personnel in the Information Systems Support branch,
N471, were not included at NM.PDS planning meetings. Though
N471 personnel kept the current systems going from day to
day, any problems encountered were considered status quo.
They were told by CDR Cinder that OAIS would solve all of
their problems. Focus was on development and the future.
Towards this end, CDR Rice and CDR Cinder had developed
extensive integration plans. Having the Order Production
Module (OPM) would enable the combination of officer and
enlisted order generation. They envisioned the combination
of the Officer and Enlisted Error Research Sections.
LT Smith, in charge of the error research divisions,
felt a lack of connection between reality and the
integration plans. She convinced CDR Cinder to hold off on
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the integration plans for the error research division due to
the vast differences between the officer and enlisted
programs through which OAIS and EAIS interfaced.
LT Smith was not invited to attend OAIS User
Representative meetings either. Though her personnel were
tasked by LT Hopkins and were responsible for answering
error research questions and investigating AUTONOM rejects,
she was not included. However, she attended as many
meetings as possible.
5. Tra4ninn
LT Perkins was not as busy as she was used to,
having just come from an officer-in-charge billet. A new
list of users was provided by Configuration Management on a
weekly basis to LT Perkins. LT Perkins would visit the
personnel individually and offer them training. Training
consisted of hands-on training for OAIS and ODIS. In some
divisions, the O1 IS user representative would set up
training for their new personnel, knowing the full value of
training by LT Perkins. In other divisions new users
decided they did not have time for training in the short
turnover period.
LT Perkins felt left out of the main stream of
activities. There were no professional nor friendly
overtures from personnel within the OAIS project through
which she would naturally have interfaced.
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6. OAIS Planned Changes
When LT Hopkins took over, plans were already
underway at the contractors for a conversion of the software
version of OAIS. The first version of APSCOBOL was JK and
it was developed in 1981. Since that time, SAGE had
discovered quite a few problems with the code and wanted to
enhance their product. SAGE announced that they were
discontinuing support for the JK version.
In addition to the software conversion, the
orderwriting portion of OAIS was redesigned. The current
orderwriting procedures were just an automated version of
the manual method. With the advent of automation and the
input of several serious users, shortcuts and enhancements
were needed and desired to the orderwriting process. Also,
it was planned that the Order Production Module would take
the place of AUTONOM. The Order Production Module would be
the responsibility of NMPC-47, in addition to supporting an
increased variety of order formats as compared to AUTONOM
capabilities. Over the three years of OAIS production,
reliance on AUTONOM without a formal level of service
agreement with NMPC-16 had been a cause of many problems
concerning late or missing updates and production of hard
copy orders.
7. Navy Programming Responsibilities
The job of writing the new orderwriting procedures
was given to the Application Programming Shop. This shop
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consisted mostly of programming experienced, Data Processing
Technicians (DP). The DP in charge was DPI Brown. DPi
Brown took the responsibility for rewriting the orderwriting
procedures. He and a few DP's worked relatively on their
own at NMPC.
The contractors were responsible for conversion of
the existing OAIS code, both batch and online, and the
correction of several trouble reports. The grand plan was
that the DP's and the concractors would work closely
together, so that the DP's zould become more familiar with
OAIS programs which they were due to take over after this
conversion effort. Some - DP's and systems administration
personnel worked with the contractors at their site in
Rockville, Maryland and assisted with the conversion.
There was little coordination between DPI Brown and
the personnel at SAGE prior to implementation. Also, a late
decision was made concerning the OPM. It was determined
that it would not be ready in time for a May implementation,
so the new version of OAIS had to be jury-rigged to
interface with AUTONOM. Bits and pieces of the new software
were tested separately, but there was not a complete test of
the OAIS application nor a systems stress test to check the
performance of the hardware with the new version of
APSCOBOL.
LT Hopkins asked questions about testing procedures,
but was inexperienced and really did not know the right
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questions to ask. Also, at this time there was no separate
test vehicle available for testing. The testing that was
done was done on a timesharing basis, with batch production
jobs, in the evening hours.
8. Preparation for May 1986 Implementation
In preparation for the new version of OAIS set to
come on-line in May 1986, LT PerKins updated the
orderwriting procedures for inclusion in the OAIS User
Manual. In April, CDR Hazel and LT Perkins arranged
training sessions with the OAIS users in a conference room
to review changes to OAIS and to distribute the updated OAIS
User Manual.
On the first day of production for the new version
of OAIS, LT Hopkins waited impatiently in her office to hear
how OAIS was doing. This was her first time managing a
computer software project as well as being her first major
accomplishment at the command.
D. CASE STUDY THREE
1. Background
A new version of OAIS with an ungraded version of
software and an enhanced orderwriting module was implemented
two days ago. These changes were the first major changes
made to OAIS. A combination of Data Processing Technicians
and contractor personnel worked on the programming portion
of development. There had been little liaison between OAIS
project team members and no separate test vehicle to support
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on-line testing of OAIS changes. Up until this point, OAIS
had been the darling of Naval Military Personnel Command
both for the enhancements it had made to the officer
distribution process and its ability to provide up-to-date
information.
2. Command Decision
CAPT Williams, NMPC-47 Department Head, slowly
walked back from conferring with his boss, Admiral Duke.
Admiral Duke was the head of the Distribution Division. The
hastily-called meeting concerned the poor performance of the
new version of OAIS that had just been implemented two days
previously. Admiral Duke had received numerous complaints
about OAIS' slow response time and downtime (unavailability)
from the department heads responsible for Surface, Aviation
and Submarine officer distribution. As usual, Admiral Duke
wanted to know why. He did not understand computer
terminology and thus it was even harder for CAPT Williams to
explain the complications. All the Admiral understood was
that orders were not being processed and sent out.
Several options had been discussed at an earlier
meeting with NMPC-47 branch heads. One option was to keep
OAIS up so that the problems and causes of the slow response
time could be determined. The contractors favored this
approach since the majority of the change was the newly
converted software code. The disadvantage of this option
would be a continued lack of orders and with the slow
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response time, many users would not use OAIS. The users
wanted the old version of OAIS back so that they could get
orders out. By going back to the old version, several
enhancements lobbied for by the users and an enhanced
orderwriting module would be lost. These users were still
the first generation of users and remembered life without
OAIS. They had no experience with making the best even
better. NMPC-47 realized that going back to the old version
of OAIS would mean a loss of credibility with users and
other organizations and an increase in resources necessary
to solve the problem off-line, including manpower, dollars
and time. Production issues involved getting OAIS JK back
on-line, running all the updates from external interfaces
and cancelling the updates generated by the new version of
OAIS to external interfaces. The users would lose all the
work that they had been able to get done on OAIS 1.7 and the
time needed to get OAIS JK running again would cause OAIS to
be unavailable to the users.
CAPT Williams told YN3 Smith to contact the branch
heads, CDR Rice in charge of N470, Information Systems
Development branch; CDR Griffin in charge of N471,
Information Systems Support branch; CDR Hazel in charge of
N472, Order Support branch; and LT Hopkins who was the OAIS
Project Officer. All players had met on numerous occasions
over the past two days trying to determine just what the
cause of the OAIS problems was. Once everyone was assembled
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in his office, CAPT Williams announced his course of action.
"Take OAIS 1.7 down immediately and restore OAIS JK (old
version) as soon as possible. At yesterday's status meeting
I was told it would take 14 hours of contractor time to
restore the old version. I want an estimate of when the old
version of OAIS will be available for detailer use. Jeff
(CDR Hazel), I want your staff to work overtime if necessary
to get any priority orders out manually. That's all."
It was a silent group that walked out of the CAPT's
office. Very rarely had they seen the CAPT this angry. CDR
Rice was fuming. OAIS was his pet project and had been the
darling of NMPC until the past few days. LT Hopkins, a
recent graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, could not
believe how wrong things had gone. CDR Hazel thought to
himself, I tried to tell them it wasn't ready and shouldn't
be implemented. Now we'll all have to live with the
consequences.
3. Responses
CDR Griffin was the most recent addition to NMPC-47,
having been on-board only four weeks. CDR Griffin was also
a recent graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School. He did
not want to have to tell CAPT Williams that it would take
more than 14 hours of downtime to restore the OAIS JK
version. CDR Griffin thought the project office people
always conveniently seemed to forget the production portion
of the business.
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User confidence in OAIS was shaken. There were some
dissatisfied users due to promises of enhancements to be
contained within OAIS 1.7, which were now delayed for an
indefinite period of time.
Tempers were high and finger-pointing was rife
within NMPC-47 and SAGE. DPI Brown, who was in charge of
the Navy's portion of the joint effort between the
contractor and the Navy, bore the brunt of the blame. The
attitude and arrogance on the part of the DP's was
criticized.
The main problem identified with OAIS 1.7 was
degraded system performance due to the enormous demands made
on the system from the converted code. This slowed response
time to users and overtaxed the Central Processing Unit
(CPU). When CAPT Williams had the new version of OAIS
brought down, SAGE, the contractors, were all for keeping
the new version up so that they could understand and work
with the problem.
LT Hopkins adopted two changes to her management
techniques of OAIS. She decided to modularize OAIS into
smaller portions and have test plans drawn up for each
screen, module, program and interface of OAIS.
4. Contract Change
About this time, OP-0, the department in charge of
manning plans for the Navy, slashed the DP manning
requirements for NMPC-47. NMPC-47 knew that they did not
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have the personnel nor the expertise to maintain OAIS. This
big change to the game plan required internal and external
changes.
In June 1986, SAGE was approached by NMPC-47 top
management personnel, CAPT Williams and Mr Smith, concerning
taking over the maintenance of OAIS in addition to their
current responsibility for development. This change in
tasking required changes to the contract.
During this renegotiation, SAGE demanded that they
be given full control over DAIS programming. A prime
complaint of SAGE's was a lack of control for the full
system when part of the , gramming was being done by Navy
DP's. SAGE attributed this lack of control to being a major
cause of the recent failure. Having complete control would
enable the contractor to have complete confidence in and
responsibility for the results when it came time for
implementation again.
E. CASE STUDY FOUR
1. Background
NMPC-47 had just put the old version of OAIS back
into production after two days of user complaints concerning
slow response time. It was the first time a major problem
had developed with OAIS. LT Hopkins made two changes to her
management techniques. She wanted OAIS broken into modules
and test plans developed for each screen, menu and program.
The contractors took on the responsibility for both OAIS
44
development and maintenance. It was a time for coming up
,ith solutions to the OAIS problems and organizational
change.
2. Transition of N471 to a Full Production Division
Throughout the fall of 1986, NMPC-47 experienced the
growing pains of transition from a development-oriented
division to one where production was of growing importance.
Up to and including the present time, the day-to-day running
of the department was driven by CDR Rice's priorities and
those of his project officers. Even though OAIS was a
production application with all intended users on-line, OAIS
was handled as an application still under development.
The day-to-day decisions concerning OAIS production
issues were handled by LT Hopkins. These included
production-oriented decisions such as scheduling of batch
jobs, updates, downtime, user impact, running of OAIS user
meetings, production of OAIS User Bulletins and
responsibility for daily messages on the OAIS sign-on
screen.
The failure of OAIS 1.7 seemed to highlight these
growing pains and brought into focus such issues as matrix
management, customer support and training. The bottom line
was that users had become highly dependent on OAIS for
accomplishment of their daily work.
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3. CDR Griffin Chanaes to N471
CDR Griffin was the primary force behind the
transition of the Information Systems Support branch, N471,
into the branch responsible for production decisions. In
addition to the issues of customer support and training,
systems maintenance and production scheduling were becoming
more and more important. The informal matrix management
established between CDR Rice and CDR Griffin's predecessor
was done away with. Training was moved from N470 to N471.
See Figure 4.
CDR Griffin changed the mission of the error
research personnel from being responsible for a portion of
the OAIS user interface to being responsible for all
customer liaison with OAIS users. The nape of this newly
tasked division was the OAIS Help Desk. LT Perkins, the
current Training Officer, was identified as the logical
person to heal up the OAIS Help Desk because of her current
involvement with the assignment and placement officers and
her functional knowledge of OAIS.
A training room was set up in an unused conference
room. Approximately eight extra terminals were set up for
training of either individuals or groups of users.
Scheduling of the conference room was the responsibility of
the training officer. Training evolutions had first
priority for usage of the room. The room was windowless





Deprten Headle Lr Smith
IntoI PerkOrde
Team.Thsystem waslo copos spot anueprtfrmecaeao
N471.~ d ThsRie inldd oniguin Maagmet QAIS
~~OieHelp DesSsesAmnsto andpapvrtyoote
people L depeninso the prblem This ghlroaeddb
!%lirealef IKIS r47
CDR Griffin and manned by technical personnel, not managers.
Problems were explained, solutions discussed and a decision
to remedy the situation was made immediately. See Figure 4.
4. Conflict Between N470 and N471
There was conflict between N470 and N471 primarily
due to allocation of resources between application develop-
ment and application production. Up until this point in
time, the emphasis in NMPC-47 had been on development
issues. OAIS expertise had existed only in N470, the
Information Systems Development branch. With OAIS usage
growing and subsequently dependence on the application,
other considerations were necessary. Maintenance of systems
software and hardware were a necessity. Additionally,
confusion on reporting responsibilities that a matrix
management system wrought on functional management was
exhibited.
LT Perkins and LT Hopkins were constantly at logger-
heads over responsibility of the day-to-day activities of
OAIS. Both CDR Hazel and CDR Griffin agreed with LT Perkins
that operational control of OAIS belonged in Information
Systems Support branch, N471, vice the Information Systems
Development branch, N470.
The offices of LT Hopkins and LT Perkins were
separated by two long hallways. LT Perkins' office was
located next to the OAIS Help Desk and Systems
Administration where OAIS operations were monitored. When a
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glitch developed during the course of a work day or a crisis
was identified, LT Perkins had to consult with LT Hopkins.
This wasted valuable time concerning both a fix and
notification to the users as to OAIS status. This wasted
time during a crisis added to the adversity between LT
Hopkins and LT Perkins.
Not only was there a struggle between LT Perkins and
LT Hopkins, but there was one between the branch heads, CDR
Griffin and CDR Rice. There was disagreement when it came
to allocation of resources, both personnel and money, as
well as the priorities of systems maintenance and
enhancement versus software development. Systems
maintenance was continually put off until there was time for
it. Time seemed to be found on Saturday and Sunday
mornings.
By the spring of 1987, full control of day-to-day
operations of OAIS were within N471, the Information Systems
Support branch. The upcoming retirement of CDR Rice
hastened the process. CDR Rice's replacement was LCDR Wall.
LCDR Wall was more receptive to new ideas, more politically
oriented, as well as being junior to CDR Griffin.
LT Perkins took over full responsibility for
production decisions and scheduling of batch jobs. She also
took over responsibility for OAIS User Bulletin publishing
and distribution.
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5. OAIS Help Desk
The mission of the OAIS Help Desk was to improve the
current level of user assistance. Instead of OAIS users
having to contact various representatives within NMPC-47 for
assistance with different problems, the OAIS Help Desk would
be the single point of contact. This included questions on
OAIS usage, orderwriting, hardware problems, updates of
information and the status of OAIS.
Naturally there v.-!re growing pains. NMPC-47 workers
had to learn to say, "Hav( you contacted the Help Desk?"
instead of running out to Lix a problem. There was extreme
difficulty in areas wherr ego was associated with power.
One of these areas was hardware maintenance. It was very
hard for the hardware maintenance personnel, who up to this
time had been worshipped as heros due to their knowledge of
computer hardware, to become part of a total customer
service concept. Also users had found shortcuts or their
favorite helpers and constantly called them.
The enlisted personnel manning the help desk phones
had to increase their knowledge of OAIS as well as learn
patience for frustrated users. When OAIS did not work
correctly, was down or contained bad information, the people
that bore the brunt of user frustration were the OAIS Help
Desk personnel and LT Perkins. If an officer was not
satisfied with the answers provided by the OAIS Help Desk,
they would call CDR Griffin, CDR Rice or even CAPT Williams.
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Users had to learn that the OAIS Help Desk would get the job
done.
The phone calls to LT Hopkins concerning OAIS Help
Desk issues were of particular note. LT Hopkins would
usually proceed to investigate the problem on her own
without informing LT Perkins until later.
LT Perkins spent a lot of her time educating users
with reminders of, "Next time please call the Help Desk" and
building customer trust in herself and her personnel's
performance.
6. OAIS Help Desk Phone Log
A phone log procedure was implemented in order to be
able to track incoming requests and to conduct a follow-up
when users called again. Several cases of help requests not
being fulfilled, with users complaining to CDR Griffin,
fueled this change.
User name, time, date of call and complaint were
logged. Calls pertaining to hardware problems or User Id's
needing reset were given a control number and sent to the
appropriate section of N471, the Information Systems Support
branch for correction. This process established an auditing
activity of the log book by LT Perkins from which she could
detect the flavor of calls and identify any particular
trends or problems pertaining to training.
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7. Growth of User Base
As each day went by, the number of users on OAIS and
ODIS continued to rise steadily. Requests were received
from outside of NMPC for access to the application. A major
policy decision was made that NMPDS information was just for
Distribution Department purposes. Problems were encountered
as the number of users increased.
8. Port Pirates
There were more terminals than there were ports on
the bus interface units of the local area network. Primary
users of NMPDS were designated as NMPC-4 and NMPC-2
personnel. Other users were secondary. Primary users were
assigned by division, a range of port numbers (one for every
user) which were theirs to use. Specific port assignment
was left up to a division. Secondary users were assigned a
few port numbers. The policy for secondary users was use
OAIS and then sign off the port so that other personnel
could have access. If more personnel than there were ports
available wanted to get on OAIS, they had to port pirate.
Port pirating involves trying various port numbers
to see if they were vacant to get on OAIS. If a primary
user's port was pirated he would call the help desk for
resolution. The port pirate was bumped off the pirated port
and the primary user was able to sign on. Particularly on a
Monday morning, a large amount of the calls to the help desk
were those complaining of port pirates.
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9. OAIS Dependence
A crisis seemed to develop quickly whenever a
problem with OAIS occurred, whether it be a bad back-up tape
from the Officer Master File (OMF) or a hardware failure.
This crisis environment was due to the heavy dependence of
assignment and placement officers on OAIS. Also, senior
personnel within NMPC had come to rely on OAIS to supply
them with information on personnel, tracking of orders and
for answering questions from Admirals and the Fleet. Due to
this dependence on OAIS, CDR Griffin required LT Perkins or
one of her personnel to personally deliver an OAIS User
Bulletin or message concerning OAIS downtime to NMPC-47's
Captain and the Admiral (NMPC-4).
10. Experienced Users
The users were becoming comfortable with computer
usage and OAIS. With this comfortableness the users started
coming up with better ways of doing things and ideas on
automating other parts of their workload. Their ideas were
turned into LT Hopkins in the form of a Software Change
Proposal (SCP). LT Hopkins' response was that NMPC-47 would
consider the changes after the new version of OAIS came up.
It was during this timeframe that shortcuts to
circumvent the chop chain and unprotected data fields within
OAIS were discovered by the OAIS hackers (expert users).
When these were discovered by NMPC-47, fixes were quickly
implemented. One of the hacker changes included using one
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of the orderwriting screens for sending messages to other
personnel in the chop chain. This discovery prompted an
addition of a message screen for such a purpose in the new
orderwriting menu to be implemented with the 1.7 conversion.
The Aviation Department was using a screen designed
for the Submarine Department. The screen was designed to
keep track of hulls and Unit Identification Codes (UIC)
assignments for new submarines, but the Aviators were using
it for their in-house telephone directory.
Other abuses of OAIS included personal utilization
of information covered by the Privacy Act. Such abuses
included checking out a medical doctor or lawyer's history
and fitness reports prior to using their services.
Screen by screen access was monitored by
Configuration Management. Decisions concerning access or
denial of access came through the chain of command of a new
user, to their user representative and lastly to LT Perkins
for final approval. One security precaution had been
specifying the rank level for fitness report review. For
example, an Ensign was typically granted access to only
Ensign or Lieutenant Junior Grade fitness reports unless
their job required other access.
11. OAIS user meetinQs
OAIS user meetings were held on an as-needed basis.
They were called for and run by LT Hopkins. User
representatives from each division attended on a sporadic
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basis. The focus of each meeting was usually development-
oriented. Users continuously turned in additional
requirements and enhancements for OAIS to LT Hopkins. All
change requests were put on hold until OAIS 1.7 was
implemented. LT Perkins attended these meetings, but rarely
had anything to discuss save trouble reports called in to
the OAIS Help Desk.
12. OAIS User Bulletins
Information concerning OAIS was also promulgated by
use of OAIS User BulletinE These OAIS User Bulletins were
sent to every OAIS user on an as-needed basis. Green paper
was used so that they wo- -1 be easily distinguishable in a
basket full of papers. Information such as scheduled
downtime on a weekend or a trend of problems noticed by the
help desk were contained on a User Bulletin.
13. Training
LT Perkins was still the Tr,, ing Officer. Training
continued as before. Some departing OAIS users scheduled
training for their reliefs as they new the full value of
training by LT Perkins. In other divisions new personnel
decided they did not have time for training in the short
turnover period. New users got some on-the-job training
from their predecessor and any problems they encountered
they called the OAIS Help Desk.
These calls required OAIS Help Desk personnel to
become quite familiar with all aspects of OAIS and brought a
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slight change in their mission. Instead of just correcting
errors in the final product, orders, or notifying the
correct department for a hardware problem, OAIS Help Desk
personnel learned to operate screens and understand the
various portions of the officer assignment process. The
acquisition of the whole picture at the help desk increased
the number of "experts" on OAlS, who could be turned to in
times of crisis.
14. Morale of N47's Data Processing Technici-.ns
Morale of NMPC-47 DP's was a constant concern. Many
of the positions were filled by first class or personnel on
their first tour with the Navy. First class tours were six
years. Unless they were able to get into the elite groups
of the Information Center or Systems Administration, many
got out. Personnel new to NMC>-47 were started out either
at a help desk or in Scheduling. The Data Processing
Technicians viewed the help desk job as that of secretary,
which in their minds was a far cry from being a computer
programmer. After some time they could be moved to other
parts of the branch, in which their training would be of
use, but there was no designated path of career progression.
Changes in job description and division were determined by
performance and vacancies. The expert status conveyed upon
the members of the OAIS Help Desk significantly increased
their morale.
56
The majority of DP's want to program. There was
little programming to be done due to the integration and
sharing of resources called for in the NMPDS plan. It was
an accountability matter for the contractors that if they
are held responsible for the program, they did not want
anyone else to be allowed to make changes to it. The DP's
responded to added pressures and hicgh cost of living, which
is synonymous with working in Washington D.C. at a
headquarters command, by getting out of the service. Many
were able to find lucrative jobs with computer companies and
make more money.
15. System Administration Improvements
A test environment for OAIS, called TOAIS, was
developed by the Systems Administration division. With CDR
Griffin giving Systems Administration the emphasis it
needed, future plans for hardware and software were
expanded.
a. Security
A major issue in October 1986 was the
introduction of a security system for signing into NMPDS.
This security system would increase overall security and
data integrity. The current procedures required specific
signon procedures for each of the applications under N1PDS.
The goal was a standard sign-on procedure. The first -ep
was incorporation of an overall shell security system,
called RACF, which when successfully accessed would allow
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access to the other applications within NMPDS with their
individual passwords. With RACF in place, users were
required to remember their RACF password and their password
for each application.
When RACF was implemented it was discovered that
many users did not have their own User Id's, but used those
of other personnel. This was E security violation. Each
user is given capabilities and access to certain screens
within OAIS based upon the job they are to fill in the
assignment process. It was also discovered at this time
that some assignment and placement officers had given their
User Id's to their secretaries to do their work. In essence
this was also a security violation as well as an avoidance
of using OAIS.
It took a lot of work to get the RACF system
working properly. Users had to acquire User Id's and they
frequently forgot their password and had to call the help
desk to have it reset. The help desk personnel had to
ensure that the person who was calling for a User Id reset
was actually the user.
b. NMPDS Dial-Up Capability
Users had become more and more dependent on OAIS
and ODIS. To facilitate detailer trips to the field, a
dial-up capability for OAIS and ODIS was implemented.
Through the establishment of an 800 number, procurement of
lap-top microcomputers and modems with secure calculator
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generated passwords, detailers were able to access OAIS and
ODIS from the field. This greatly decreased their manual
paperwork, impressed constituents in the field and increased
constituent confidence in the detailing system.
If a detailer trip was going to the west coast,
special arrangements were made through the help desk to have
OAIS stay operational longer than the usual downtime of
1800. This delayed backups aid batch jobs in the evening,
put if planned far enough in advance, could be handled
without difficulty or delay in workload.
16. Software Maintenance for OAIS
Maintenance to the older version of OAIS was being
done by the DP's in the Application Programming Shop within
N470, the Information Systems Development branch, on an as-
available basis. This maintenance tasking was to be just
until OAIS 1. 7 came up. The contractors did not have enough
personnel to handle development and maintenance due to the
recent contract change.
Most of the changes were maintenance-oriented, with
only a few high priority development changes. The change
process involved changes to the program but no changes to
documentation. The development-oriented changes included
giving OAIS the ability to handle the processing of Release
from Active Duty (RAD) orders, Resignation orders and
Retirement orders. The change for RAD and Resignation
59
orders occurred in December 1986 and the change for
Retirement Orders occurred in March 1987.
These changes increased OAIS's usage. Previous to
this, Resignation and Retirement (RAD) orders had to be
.iritten manually. The manual process took far too long and
chops on the orders were needed from a variety of personnel
serving in several different divisions. Personnel in CDR
Hazel's division had to type these manual orders. CDR Hazel
was always looking for ways to improve OAIS and reduce
manual work. He worked closely with the N470 programmers to
have OAIS changed to accommodate these two order formats.
With a few small exceptions, all types of orders
could now be written on OAIS. Due to the changes made by
CDR Hazel, the orders which still had to be typed manually,
due to OAIS's inability to handle them, were down to
approximately five a day. This is a significant amount when
approximately 30,000 sets of orders (basic orders and
modifications) were sent out annually. NMPC-2, who is
responsible for RAD, Resignation and Retirement orders, was
now a full-fledged user of OAIS.
17. ODIS Improvements
During this time, rapid advances and changes were
being implemented in ODIS. These changes made the life of
assignment and placement officers easier. The ability to
get Officer Data Cards (ODC) by social security number from
ODIS was implemented in December 1986. Officer Data Cards
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carry a condensed version of an officer's personnel history
on a single sheet of paper. These ODC's wece handy for
quick reference and detailing trips. ODIS was able to
provide a one to two day turnaround as opposed to requesting
the service from NMPC-16 and waiting a week to ten days.
ODIS training and abilities were advertised heavily
during this time. Many of the reports and information
changes that assignment and placement officers desired and
had submitted in the forr of Software Change Proposals
(which were on hold until implementation of the new version)
were available through the latabase of ODIS. ODIS was not
quite as "user friendly" -s OAIS. Commands were in an
English-like language and knowledge of some boolean algebra
was required to operate the database. The Information
Center was available for assisting users with ODIS.
Additionally, through ODIS, an electronic mail
system was available to all users. The electronic mail
systen required a separate password, as did ODIS usage.
Electronic mail was utilized on a s oradic basis throughout
NMPC-4 with s)me departments taking Lull advantage of the
system and others ignoring it.
18. Contractor Project Management
Throughout July and August of 1986, the contractors
tore OAIS apart, broke it down into workable size modules as
per LT Hopkins' direction and identified areas requiring
work. LT Hopkins allowed the contractor to start from
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scratch in fixing bugs and programming/redesigning Navy
code.
In September, the contractors requested an OAIS
functional expert from the Navy to assist on a daily basis,
to make decisions and guide fixes on the reprogrammed
version of OAIS. LT Hopkins knew she did not have the
expertise to assist the contractors, but at the same time
she felt the need to be continually looking over their
shoulders.
CDR Griffin wanted CDR Hazel to be this functional
expert. CDR Griffin was determined to have OAIS 1.7 work
the next time it came up, as his division bore the brunt of
user dissatisfaction.
CDR Hazel wanted to be the functional expert
assisting the contractors. He had also borne some abuse
from the assignment and placement officers for tie failure
of OAIS in May 1986, being the closest to them due to his
previous job as Training Officer. CDR Hazel felt like one
of the plank owners of OAIS. He felt he owed it to himself,
the department and the users to make it work. CDR Hazel
felt he finally had someone on his side in the form of CDR
Griffin. Both knew user issues came first and worked
towards this end.
CDR Griffin had to take the decision concerning
designation of the functional expert to CAPT Williams as CDR
Rice did not want CDR Hazel involved. CDR Rice and his
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project officers were responsible for liaison with the
contractor and wanted to keep it that way. LT Hopkins did
not have any objections to CDR Hazel's involvement, she
wanted to get back out there with a quality product.
CDR Hazel was designated as the functional expert to
assist SAGE. He spent every day of September and October
with the contractors. He assisted in the identification of
bugs, instructed on fixes and made decisions on functional
issues. He was also able to correct minor things which,
though of a low-level priority, still bothered him. These
included standardizing messages and making error messages
understandable to the users instead of being in programmer
code. CDR Hazel was on his own. CDR Griffin and LT Perkins
occasionally asked him how things were going.
In November 1986, it was announced that OAIS 1.7
would be implemented in March 1987.
The contractors spent most of the fall and winter of
1986 converting OAIS code from JK to 1.7. The code
conversion had originally been planned to be a straight
line-for-line conversion in view of the design standard of
upward compatibility between different versions of APSCOBOL.
It was discovered during the preliminary testing of module
integration that more than straight line conversion was
necessary. Modules had to be completely reworked to conform
to the new methods of how the programs were called and how
transportation from screen to screen was handled. The new
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version of APSCOBOL required more overhead due to the logic
changes in the software. Rewriting the logic behind the
OAIS screens and programs was time-consuming, but the
advantages of more efficient code outweighed the costs
involved.
Another major effort was the development of test
plans. One of LT Hopkins' directives after the May 1986
failure was the development of test plans. Test plans were
written by SAGE personnel and reviewed by Navy personnel.
LT Hopkins, CDR Hazel and LT Perkins reviewed the plans for
the Navy.
In February 1987, SAGE designated V. Hammer as the
new project manager for OAIS. She had previously worked on
a contract dealing with the Oificer Master File (OMF), so
she had some experience with otficer systems.
V. Hammer found three major areas needing work when
she took over the project. Two of these areas were within
OAIS. One was converting the code for all the batch jobs
and reports and verifying the Job Control Language (JCL) fcr
each. The second area concerned interface testing with the
applications that OAIS provided information to. Of
particular concern were the interfaces of the OMF, MFS and
OPM.
The OPM was under a different project at SAGE as
well as being managed by a separate project officer for the
Navy in the Information Systems Development branch, N470.
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One person, Mr. Donaldson, was working on the OPM when V.
Hammer took over the OAIS project. The majority of work
being performed by Mr. Donaldson concerned getting the
orders through the Communication Center edits. V. Hammer
immediately went to her boss to express her concern over the
status of the OPM and its importance to the OAIS project,
but to no avail.
V. Hammer set her personnel to working on the
changes needed in OAIS reports. She worked on the OMF
interface, having knowledge of its workings from her
previous project. She got the OMF interface error rate down
to about five percent, a much lower figure than the current
interface between OAIS and OMF.
19. Conversion Plans
In February, the Navy decided that due to a large
amount of user work in OAIS JK, they could not just take
OAIS down and replace it with another version without
causing undue hardship to the users. A parallel conversion
was decided upon and SAGE drew up conversion plans. V.
Hammer added some slack time to the estimation of effort it
would take to do the conversion in order to give OPM testing
more time. Up to this point the OPM had failed every part
of the test plan devised for it.
The implementation date for OAIS was moved from
March to May 1987.
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The reasons behind the push for production of OPM
included in-house responsibility for order generation
instead of having to rely on NMPC-16, and having officer and
enlisted orders in the same format. This would facilitate
processing at the Personnel Support Detachments as well as
providing orders to military personnel that they could
understand.
20. Systems Stress Test
In late February 1987, a systems stress test was
planned to test how the newly converted software code worked
with the hardware. It was necessary to have users on OAIS,
both so the Central Processing Unit (CPU) could have a load
and to test the interface between various parts of the new
application, particularly those interfacing with the
orderwriting module. The test was scheduled from 1500-1530
on a Friday.
Production OAIS was taken off-line during the test.
Users were informed by OAIS User Bulletin and given specific
instructions on what processes to carry out. User
representatives also were informed at an OAIS user meeting.
User representatives and OAIS Help Desk personnel were
available in the user spaces for assistance and for
identification of problems. Since it was a Friday, there
was very little participation by the users.
A second stress test was scheduled for a Thursday
afternoon. CAPT Williams explicitly requested user
66
participation at the weekly department head meeting with the
Admiral. Procedures were as before, users were notified by
OAIS User Bulletin, and user representatives and OAIS Help
Desk personnel were in user spaces for assistance.
Participation was much better.
21. Pre-implementation
Testing was scheduled to last for six weeks starting
in March. Testing was conducted using user representatives
and experts on specific portions of OAIS. Testing took
place in the training roon for several hours each afternoon
during the month of April. Washington D.C. experienced a
heat wave during this ti- It was hot and stuffy within
the unventilated training room. The test plans were used as
a guide and user representatives verified that menus,
screens and procedures worked rorrectly. Areas that worked
correctly were signed off by the users. Test orders were
generated and used to test the OPM. CDR Hazel and LT
Perkins facilitated the testing along with two of the
contractors. LT Hopkins looked in n occasion. TOAIS was
of very small size, holding only 100 records, a small number
in comparison to the normal 70,000 records of active duty
officers. Systems personnel were assigned to monitor TOAIS
and unlock problems before they brought the computer system
to a standstill. At the end of each session, CDR Hazel
prioritized problems identified with the concurrence of LT
Perkins and the contractors. Priority categories were: fix
67
before implementation, fix within a few weeks of
implementation and nice to have. OAIS seemed to work fine.
The Order Production Module was not quite finished during
the test period, but bastardized procedures were available.
The only other system interface which was tested during this
time with the OMF-OAIS interface. Preliminary tests showed
no problems.
During the testing phase, more personnel were
assigned at SAGE to work on the OPM. New tests still showed
that the OPM did not work. V. Hammer took the issue to her
boss once again. She also talked to LT Hopkins and gave her
the proof of failure with the completed and unsuccessful
test plans. LT Hopkins took the issue to her boss, CDR
Rice, who ignored the proof and said bring up OAIS anyway.
22. Training
Some training for user representatives was conducted
during these testing sessions by LT Perkins, CDR Hazel and
the contractors. Changes to the orderwriting module were
promulgated through a new version of the OAIS User Manual.
Training on a large scale basis for all users was not
possible due to the nonavailability of TOAIS. When testing
was not going on, the contractors required use of the TOAIS
application to test and implement software fixes to problems
identified in prior testing sessions. LT Perkins hoped that
once the new version came up, that the individual user
representatives would help train the personnel in their
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departments if required. The idea of user representatives
assisting personnel in their departments was presented
during an OAIS user meeting. The personnel manning the OAIS
Help Desk were trained through participation in the testing
sessions and having some early morning access to TOAIS.
Their expertise would be of assistance to users with who are
unfamiliar with the new procedures.
LT Hopkins coordinated with LT Perkins to put out a
series of OAIS User Bulletins describing some of the new
procedures. The plan was to initiate new orders and
modifications to old orders on the new version and to use
the cld version for orders still within the chop chain. To
ensure proper usage of the new version, several screens in
the old version were disabled. Arrangements were made with
Scheduling to have contractor personnel on hand for at least
the first week of producing orders to assist the scheduling
personnel.
LT Hopkins did not want to bring up OAIS 1.7. There
were too many problems with the OAIS-Order Production Module
interface. LT Perkins and CDR Hazel also felt that the new
version was not ready. They were very familiar with the
problems existing with CAIS through their participation in
the testing. Even though contractor personnel were working
overtime, many fixes to problems discovered during testing
had not yet been implemented. CDR Hazel voiced his opinion
at a branch head meeting run by CAPT Williams and attended
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by the branch heads, CDR Rice, and CDR Griffin. CDR Rice
said, "I want OAIS operational before I retire. We have
been advertising that it would come up for six months."
23. OAIS 1.7 Changes
The majority of changes revolved around the new
orderwriting process and utilization of the OPM instead of
AUTONOM. Some of the changes to the orderwriting process
included:
- Default setting for mode of transmission changed from
message to letter. Orders are designated as
administrative message traffic and the decision was
made by the Admiral that unless the orders were to be
carried out in 30 days, letter was the designated mode
of transmittal.
- On-line help with order format. If a user was unsure
about what order format to use on a particular set of
orders he could fill in just the first digit and get a
list of all formats from which to pick. Also if a user
was unsure about a particular text to put in a set of
orders, he/she could call up all the text and read
verbatim what would be printed on the orders.
- Change of text linkers to be more user friendly. Text
linkers are used to designate which part of the orders
a specific text applies to such as detaching,
intermediate or ultimate. In OAIS JK, these linkers
were letters with no significance to the user as they
were an exact copy of the manual document, the Officer
Assignment Document. New linkers possessed some
natural linkage to the subject, D was for detaching,
and U was for ultimate.
- Change of costing information. If a set of orders was
to be modified in OAIS JK, a delta figure (plus or
minus) was incorporated in the orders. For a
modification in OAIS 1.7 Lhe amount of money was
entered without a delta.
- A system was designed to notify a order writer when a
UIC included in the orders being written was under
minimize. If minimize was in effect, orders had to go
by letter, as administrative message traffic was not
allowed.
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Incorporation of At or Near Location tables. OAIS
automatically calculated if sites for training or the
distance between two duty stations were close enough
together to be costed as one location. Also the module
automatically costed the per diem costs for training,
alleviating detailers of this chore.
Changes made to OAIS included the following, some of
which had been user requested:
- Query by Name screen. To use OAIS, a person's social
security number or Activity UIC was needed. The Query
By Name screen allowed an OAIS user to enter the first
seven letters of an officer's last name and OAIS would
provide a list of matching personnel. The user could
then select the one desired.
- Addition of a hold facility to the Action Queue. Quite
often, a set of orders is ready to go but either there
is no one identified to replace the officer, or there
is not enough money to send the orders. Orders that
were in a waiting status, caused individual assignment
and placement officer's action queues within the chop
chain to grow uncontrollable. With the hold facility,
a set of orders could be designated a hold and moved
off the action queue to a separate hold list.
- Upgrade of Security Access. Users could now have six
desk codes identified in their security file, to which
they could have access. This access was available
without having to log off and log back on again with a
different User Id. This upgrade was particularly
useful for order verifiers who worked for several
assignment officers. Also, when a user went on
vacation, access would be available to his/her desk
code.
F. CASE STUDY FIVE
1. Background
NMPC-47 was again ready to implement the new version
of OAIS with the converted code. The previous try,
approximately a year ago, had ended in failure. The past
year had been spent converting the code, correcting problems
and recoding the orderwriting module. Within the
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organization, a transition from a development to a
production orientation had taken place. Responsibility for
production OAIS had been passed to the Information Systems
Support branch and resources were allocated to systems
hardware and maintenance.
2. Implementation
The big day came on a Monday. The contractors, LT
Hopkins, LT Perkins, and CDR Hazel made the OAIS Help Desk
their headquarters as they waited for the calls to come in.
a. Week 1
The first type of problems uncovered had to do
with the security access change. Each user was now capable
of having access to six desk codes per User Id instead of
one. Users had been told of this upcoming change by OAIS
User Bulletin as well at OAIS User meetings, but there were
people who had not gotten in their paperwork to
Configuration Management to change their security profile.
Most of the other problems the first day
involved lack of training. Calls came in on how to use or
update a screen. The first sets of orders under the new
version of OAIS went out by message on Tuesday. There were
13 of them. It was not discovered until after transmittal
that instead of having a From of Chief of Naval Personnel,
the From was PERSUPPDET Crystal City. The PERSUPPDET
Crystal City address had been used in the test orders and
had not been changed.
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Orders under AUTONOM usually went out
approximately 24 hours after costing had approved the
orders. During the first weeks of OPM processing, orders
were held up for several days due to bad records being
passed to the OPM. The philosophy behind OPM development
was that the OPM was never wrong. Procedures had to be
devised to identify bad records on the first run of the OPM,
eliminate them and rerun the OPM until there were no bad
records. This took up an increasing amount of each night's
processing time. Occasion ly, work was not accomplished
before it was time to bring OAIS up in the morning.
The followin ,roblems caused inconvenience to
the users and needed a solution:
- A problem generated by the conversion process made 95
sets of orders that had actually errored out of AUTONOM
and that were AUTONOM rejects look like they had
processed successfully. There was no way to correct
these orders in either version for a few days.
- Several of the changes implemented in OAIS JK were not
included in the new version.
- Automatic chop chain routing of orders to coordinator
review and subspeciality when the orders did not
require the edit.
- Every set of orders required transferring through the
Minimize screen within the orde-writing menu, even when
the UICs were not under minimize.
Due to the orders going out with incorrect
addressees, CDR Griffin required that each day's orders had
to be reviewed prior to release. LT Perkins and CDR Hazel
were designated as the reviewers. Through this review
process, a major problem was discovered with aviation duty
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wording. The aviation duty wording determines flying status
and pay of aviation personnel. Orders were going out with
incorrect flying status determination. Looking for a fix
for this held orders up for three days.
A Communication Center procedure that had to be
kept in mind when holding up orders was that the Date-Time-
Group (DTG) on the orders could not be more than seven days
old.
CDR Hazel and V. Hammer finally located the
cause of the aviation duty wording error by going through
the code line by line. CDR Hazel, being a functional expert
on order specifics, was able to tell V. Hammer what was to
print and V. Hammer was able to identify the errors in the
code.
The first week of 0AIS 1.7 ended. All
personnel, contractors and Navy, had worked long hours and
were exhausted, but the new version of OAIS had stayed up
for a whole week, which was better than the last time. LT
Hopkins went on leave for three weeks. Her boyfriend was
coming back from a six month deployment on-board a ship.
b. Week 2
More problems developed with orders on the
second week.
- One hundred thirty sets of separation orders were sent
out to personnel that were not due to separate from the
Navy.
- Duplicate DTG's were discovered. This was in violation
of Communication Center procedure.
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- Missing DTG's were discovered in the course of routing
hard copy orders back to the originating assignment
officer. OAIS showed that some orders went out on
particular personnel with an assigned DTG, but no hard
copy was ever found. Discovery of this problem changed
the procedures involved in routing of hard copy orders.
Previously, Order Support branch personnel had
just sorted orders, keeping a copy for in-house records.
Now they were required to verify against a DTG log actual
receipt of hard copy orders. Missing orders were passed to
LT ?erkins who had been delegated liaison with the
Communication Center.
Along with ownership of the OPM came
responsibility for bad magnetic tapes. Tapes that could not
be read by the Communication Center were returned to
Scheduling and the back-up tape submitted. Occasionally
part of a tape was transmitted and in order not to
retransmit messages, a violation of Communication Center
policy, a copy of the partial tape had to be made by
contractor personnel.
The order verification process was made even
more difficult by the poor quality of reports provided to
the 0AIS Help Desk. The report formats were just copies o
the old reports from when AUTONOM and NMPC-16 were
responsible for order tracking and verification. Now that
NMPC-47 had full responsibility, more information was needed
to fulfill this job.
The change in the default value of the
orderwriter to letter versus message caused a steep increase
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in the number of orders that went out by letter. The
sorting machine was quite old and acted up on occasion.
With an increase in workload, the machine broke down at
least once a day causing a letter backup. Letters had to be
sorted manually on many a day by already-overworked
personnel.
From the first try :t generating a MFS tape
there were problems. It took about a week of working things
out between NMPC 16 and Naval Finance Center in Cleveland.
It wasn't until about two weeks into order production that
the accounting problems with orders were discovered. These
problems included:
- incorrect rank on the accounting line.
- missing accounting lines for training segments of
orders.
- incorrect report not later than, report no earlier than
dates.
- accounting data for training was printing on orders not
requiring it.
- incorrect information in the at or near location
tables.
Messages and questicns started coming in from
the fleet concerning orders. There was missing activity
text for certain Personnel Support Detachments, and
misleading text for some order,- The Communication Center
also identified problems pertaining tc the Standard Subject
Identification Code (SSIC) used on orders messages and the
use of asterisks to separate portions of the messages.
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These discrepancies were pointed out by Communication
Centers in the field.
The Communication Center threatened to
disccntinue service to NMPC-47 on several occasions, but
that threat became real when messages were transmitted
starting with Date-Time-Groups having 26 as the time. The
DTG goes on a 24 hour clock and there is no such thing as an
hour 26.
Mi.nor inconveniences included several reports
that were not printing and the Navy Times tape not being
printed. The Navy Times tape became quite an issue as Navy
Times said a lot of their readership was due to the orders
published in Navy Times. Contractor time needed to correct
order problems was diverted to the Navy Times issue.
During the second week of crisis, CDR Hazel and
LT Perkins were appointed project. officers in LT Hopkins'
absence. CDR Hazel dealt with OPM fixes and telling the
contractor what to do as they were of first priority. LT
Perkins dealt with production issues such as liaison with
Scheduling, Communication Center, order production, and
fixing OAIS problems. Upper management instituted thrice
weekly status meetings with SAGE, CDR Griffin, LCDR Wall, LT
Perkins, CDR Hazel, and some of the technical personnel from
both SAGE and NMPC-47.
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G. CASE STUDY SIX
1. Backaround
NMPC-47 is still in a crisis mode due to the
numerous problems with OAIS 1.7. OAIS has stayed
operational, but at the expense of resources, primarily
contractor overtime and NMPC-47 personnel.
2. Aftermath of May Failure
Day-to-day operations revolved around daily order
production and retransmitil of orders if necessary. Once a
day's order status (order- were or were not produced) was
known, work could continue Dn fixing trouble reports for OPM
and OAIS. The number of manual orders having to be typed by
Order Support branch personnel increased from a daily
average of five to 75. There was a constant backlog.
This crisis mode continued through the summer. LT
Hopkins returned from leave and was told she was not to get
involved with the production-oriented part of OAIS. In
July, SAGE lost the OAIS contract to another contractor,
SYSCON.
3. New Contractor
SYSCON took over as contractor for OAIS in August.
SYSCON was familiar with the workings of NMPC as they were
the contractor for two other applications within NMPDS.
Arrangements were made for the turnover of source libraries
and system documentation to SYSCON. NMPC-47 acted as
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intermediary, as there were hard feelings on the part of
SAGE personnel.
SAGE personnel involved with the OAIS project felt
quite bitter. They had worked overtime all summer without
any breaks. Blame had been placed at their feet and
everyone was calling OAIS a disaster when, in reality, OAIS
was fine; it was the OPM-OAIS inerface that did not work.
Work on OAIS and OPM trouble reports virtually came to a
standstill during the months of July and August.
LT Perkins trained the SYSCON personnel on the
functional purposes of OAIS and exposed them to the language
of the assignment and placement officers.
SYSCON did an initial examination of the order
generation problems. At the time they saw no way around tLe
quick and dirty fixes implemented by SAGE, but planned for
their demise in the near future. The thoughts of NMPC-47
management were those of starting over with a fresh attitude
and management style. CDR Griffin, CDR Hazel and LT Perkins
were impressed with the experiencE that Ms. Green, the
project manager at SYSCON, brought to OAIS. Initial
meetings with her consisted of honest and in-depth
explanations for OAIS problems. These things had not been
forthcoming from SAGE personnel. Three SYSCON personnel
were assigned to rotate staying with Scheduling to get
orders out each night.
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4. Personnel
LT Hopkins was moved to another project officer job.
A junior LT, LT Sanders was promoted from within the Surface
Department to become the OAIS Project Officer. LT Sanders
had a user's knowledge of OAIS, but did not have a computer
or software development background.
LT Perkins and CDR Hazel were still in charge of OPM
and production OAIS issues, but LT Sanders was to get the
development side of OAIS on the move again.
CAPT Hampton relieved CAPT Williams in September
1987.
5. Organization Changes
Several changes were made to the structure of the
organization after CAPT Hampton arrived. Order Support was
moved from the Order Support branch to the Information
Systems Support branch. Scheduling was moved out of Systems
Administration due to its increasingly important part of
everyday happenings. The Information Systems Support
branch, N471, was now completely customer service and
production-oriented. A new division was created out of N472
and was called Information Systems Policy and Procedures.
It included Configuration Management which was moved out of
N471 and Data Administration wniulX was moved out of N470.
See Figure 5.
Another change implemented by CAPT Hampton was that
training was mandatory for new assignment and placement
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synthesis and touch screen technology that was interactive
and user friendly.
OAIS user meetings became mandatory under the
direction of CAPT Hampton. Any user representative not in
attendance was written down as absent in the weekly user
representative meeting minutes. The minutes of each meeting
were published as dictated by CAPT Hampton.
6. Naval Audit
NMPC-47 received notification of a pending Naval
Audit concerning wasted paper due to unused and unwanted
OAIS reports.
7. OAIS Development versus OAIS Production
The initial division of labor at SYSCON was three
contractors working on production trouble reports with LT
Perkins in charge and three cctractors working on
development and necessary changes with LT Sanders in charge.
Two of these necessary changes were the addition of
several data elements to the Activity File, one of the major
applications OAIS interfaces with and implementation of the
Joint Specialty Designation and its associated tracking/
chopping of orders which had been approved by Congress.
These changes to the Activity File by EPMAC also
involved moving the location of several data elements within
the file. Plans were made for the change. SYSCON and LT
Sanders spent an entire weekend of computer and contractor
time trying to implement the change without success. LT
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Perkins was not included in their plans even though she was
an expert on OAIS. After the unsuccessful weekend, CDR
Griffin and LCDR Wall decided to put off any development
changes for several months. They decided that LT Sanders
needed to learn more about OAIS and NMPC-47 operations.
A problem uncovered during the implementation of
this change was the inadequate and old OAIS documentation.
One of the reasons there were problems with the
implementation was because the documentation was incorrect.
LT Perkins was in charge of all OAIS production-
oriented work and had all six programmers working on
production changes. CDR Griffin and LCDR Wall hoped that
with all the time spent on production problems that some
progress on long standing OAIS problems could be made. Of
particular importance was the problem with the PRD data
element. Assignment officers would update an officer's PRD
and due to problems with the Officer Master File interface,
the change would not reflect in the Officer Master File and
the PRD would change back to its previous value in OAIS.
8. Production Changes
Plans were made and progress continued toward having
the Navy personnel in Scheduling be the ones running the
batch updates and order generation at night.
A policy was implemented by CDR Griffin that
whenever a fiA was put into OPM or OAIS, a SYSCON person
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would be in Scheduling that evening to ensure that no
problems were encountered.
Another change was that all trouble reports were
prioritized by LT Perkins. LT Perkins maintained a daily
status of the progress made on individual trouble reports.
User representatives were kept informed by weekly, mandatory
OAIS meetings.
LT Perkins instigated a policy of having the Navy
test all software fixes c-nerated by SYSCON. LT Perkins
delegated most of the tesl Tng to her personnel at the OAIS
Help Desk. Involving the ,alp desk personnel in the testing
and scheduling of softwar-: changes increased their morale.
If it was a top priority trouble report she would also test
the fix herself.
LT Perkins preferred to implement the OAIS changes
in the afternoon, preferably on a Wednesday or Thursday, so
that the change would be available first thing in the
morning. User representatives were informed of the
implementation schedule at the weekly meetings. If a
problem was discovered with the fix, it could be pulled out
with only an hour of downtime. Thursdays and Fridays were
usually slow for the users as the majority of their workload
was accomplished in the early part of the week. These days
also were slow days for Scheduling. They were usually
caught up on batch jobs and had some spare time, which was
needed in case a problem arose.
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With Scheduling of more importance, several problems
came to the forefront. Actually they had been problems for
a long time, but never made it to the limelight. These
included problems with non-standard run books and program
naming conventions. The solutions were worked out with the
Configuration Control Board (CCB), Configuration Management
and SYSCON. These standards wouid be incorporated in any
new development or software fix. The CCB also decided that
a period of review prior to implementation of a fix to
ensure compliance with run book and adherence to standards
would be implemented.
Report distribution problems were also noticed.
With the OAIS 1.7 implementation, several reports were not
printing, some reports were printing incorrect information
and there were now unwanted reports requested by personnel
who had left NMPC. Report trouble reports had been given
low priority during the summer, but with a Naval Audit being
conducted, one of the junior programers at SYSCON was
assigned to fix all the report trohie reports.
CDR Hazel instituted a new policy with respect to
trouble reports for the OPM. He required a requirements
analysis be completed prior to submission of a trouble
report to the contractors. This enalysis would assist in
establishing OPM documentation.
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9. OAIS User Participation
For those trouble reports not identified as top
priority, user representative input was taken on where they
should fall in the priority scheme. LT Sanders was getting
the paperwork side of the OAIS development in order. She
collected approximately 200 SCP's that had been submitted
over the past three years. Records had not been maintained
very well and she was not sure if some of the changes had
already been implemented. User representatives were asked
to vote on the priority of SCP's for development. When a
software fix to OAIS involved a specific procedure for a
group of users, the applicable users would be asked to test
the fix before it went into production.
10. NMPDS Planning/Integration
A Configuration Control Board (CCB) was established
in NMPC-47. Members included branch heads, Data
Administration, Configuration Management, Systems
Administration, Scheduling, project officers and help desk
personnel. The purpose of the CCB was to review plans and
changes to all four applications under the NMPDS umbrella.
The plan was to ensure compatibility of all the applications
under NMPDS for future integration and resource sharing.
All software fixes and a plan f-zr implementing the fix were
routed around to various members of the CCB for signoff
before the weekly scheduled meeting.
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At the weekly scheduled meeting, the initiator of
the trouble report, usually LT Perkins, briefed the board
members as necessary and advised them on the schedule for
implementation. SYSCON was also invited to CCB's on an as-
required basis. Their role was u.;ually to explain a lr.enj
range plan for correction of a problem.
11. Electronic Mail Usage
CAPT Hampton believed in the electronic mail system.
He ensured command usage of electronic mail within NMPC-47
by sending out all his messages to the branch heads on it.
With top-down support, the branch heads implemented
electronic mail into their routines. Usage traveled further
down the chain of command until every manager made sure they
read their mail everyday.
By late November, the major problems with the OPM
were solved. The quick and dirty programs were still in
place because replacements for them were quite involved.
Some development efforts were started. OAIS users had





This chapter analyzes each of the six case studies.
Section One contains questions which can be used for two
purposes: to help a student prepare the case or to lead off
questions for a class discussion. Section Two is a summary
of the case study. Section Three lists the major issues or
problems that the case study deals with. Identification of
these issues links potential lecture material with the case.
Section IV is the case analysis in which theories pertinent
to the case are discussed and the particular facts of the
case are related to the theory.
One specific area of analysis which will be included in
all six cases is Nolan's Stages of Growth Model [Ref. ll:pp.
672-673]. Nolan has researched information systems
development throughout many organizations. His research
involved the monitoring of information systems investments,
information systems budgets, types of applications being
developed, and the degree of management control and planning
utilized. By looking at these factors he noticed definite
shifts in the direction and gr-wth of the information
systems. He developed a model covering six stages of growth
of both the information systems and the management of the
information systems. Not every organization or information
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system passes through all of these phases, but they are a
good indication of possible directions for the future. This
model can assist an information systems department to
evaluate its present and future decisions in comparison with
basic indicators of growth. See Figure 6. Throughout the
case series, the stage or stages that NMPC-47 is in will be
identified and discussed. [Ref. ll:pp. 672-673)
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Figure 6. Nolan's Stages of Growth Model
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B. CASE STUDY ONE TEACHING NOTE
1. Ouestions
- What problems do you anticipate with the development
and implementation of the management information
system?
- What was done well in the development and
implementation?
- What affects do you think implementation of the
prototype will have on the Life Cycle Management of
OAIS?
2. Case Summary
This part of the case series provides the background
conce rning the establishme : of the Officer Assignment
Information System (OAIS). Descriptions of the users, user
requirements, command miL -on, and OAIS requirements are
discussed. The development methodology chosen for OAIS
development was prototyping. The software utilized was
Application Productivity System (APS)COBOL, a third
generation language. NMPC-47 was on the leading edge of
technology by utilizing prototyping versus the traditional
development approach. The initial deployment of OAIS, the
problems encountered throughout the user organization, and
the improvements OAIS made in a previously manual assignment
process are described.
3. Major Issues/Problems
- Use of prototyping development methodology and a new
generation of software.
- Deployment of the prototype due to user dependence.
- Poor documentation.
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- Lack of pre-implementation activities for the
application and the effects on the users.
4. Case Analysis
a. Nolan's Stages of Growth
Stage one is called Start Up. This stage begins
with the first computer acquisition of an organization. In
this stage the computer is being utilized for general and
administrative projects whose automation would result in
cost savings. There is quite a bit of change; change in
jobs and working habits and fear of the unknown. [Ref.
ll:p. 672]
NMPC-47 has juzt entered the Start Up stage.
The assignment process is one c- an administrative nature.
The first computer has not even been procured and a leasing
arrangement is providing the cor-ting power. Personnel
within the computer organizatin who are used to manual
methods and potential users of the system are resisting the
change and fearing the unknown.
b. Prototyping Methodology
Prototyping is a devel ,ment methodology that
enables the developer of a computer application to create a
working model of the software to be built [Ref. 12:p. 22].
Prototyping is used in cases where the speed of implementa-
tion of the computer application is of the essence and/or
where the users are unable to specify explicitly what they
want the system to do. Good potential computer application
candidates for use of the prototyping methodology include:
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those where the user is concerned about screen format, where
the system will be on-line, where there are very few
algorithmic details, and the system utilization is for ad
hoc retrieval or record management [Ref. 13:p. 61]. The
prototyping takes the place of requirements definition in
the traditional classical project life cycle development
methodology.
The prototyping steps are as follows: (1)
identify the user's known information requirements; (2)
develop a working model; (3) have the users use the system
in a "hand's on" manner and note user requests for changes;
and (4) refine or expand user requirements through
development of ancther model [Ref. ll:p. 6121. This process
is iterative and continues until the user is satisfied with
the working prototype. Not only does the user clarify his
requirements for the computer application, but the developer
of the system also receives a clearer picture of what needs
to be done [Ref. 12:p. 23]. One problem that has been
identified with prototyping is the tendency of users to
accept a premature prototype. A major factor contributing
to this is dissatisfaction with the current system [Ref.
14:p. 2].
The assumption within the prototyping
methodology is that once the users are satisfied with the
prototype, the model will be thrown away and replaced with
real programs by following the design, code, test and
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implementation steps of the traditional development
methodology [Ref. 13:p. 61]. The reasons for throwing away
the working model are as follows: The emphasis of the
prototyping method is on the output, not how the output is
produced [Ref. ll:p. 612]. This emphasis on the output
combined with the fact that the developer is working under a
time constraint leads to the pzzsibility of compromises in
Lne implementation of the inner workings of the model. Such
things as error recovery, audit trails, backup/restart
facilities, user and system documentation and conversion
procedures may be glossed over rRef. 13:p. 62]. An
inefficient algorithm may be incorporated or an inappropri-
ate operating system may be utilized all in the interest of
time and output [Ref. 12:p. 23]. Factors which affect the
life cycle of the computer system such as overall software
quality, and long term maintainablilty may not be considered
[Ref. 12:p. 23).
The decision to use the prototyping methodology
at NMPC was an excellent one. Problems with the manual
assignment process had been discussed for several years. Of
particular significance was the amount of time it took to
process an individual officer's assignment. Each assignment
took approximately four to five weeks to get approval. The
assignment then had to be manually costed and typed before
transmission to the officer. Other problems included
officer information existing in different files within
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different computer systems in NMPC-16, accuracy of the data,
inaccurate reporting instructions on moves, and inability to
consider a large pool of possible assignments. Since the
users were a diverse group, with the manual assignment
process being adapted differently for each department
(Aviation, Submarine, and Surface), NMPC-47 was unsure
exactly what the user requirements were. Additionally, due
to the timeframe of development, the early 1980's, problems
with the traditional life cycle development were coming to
light. Cost overruns, schedule delays, and computer systems
not meeting user requirements characterized the current
state of the industry. The prototype was developed and
users from the Surface Department helped refine the wcrking
model.
c. Selection of Software
APSCOBOL, a product still under development, was
chosen as the software for OAIS. The Application
Productivity System portion consisted of an application
generation tool which would interface well with the
prototyping methodology. Application generators are
software programs that permit specification of an entire
application at a high level without having to be concerned
with the coding of each line cf code. The application
generator produces the source code based upon the
specifications [Ref. l1:p. 254]. It can also allow a junior
programmer to produce sophisticated code after just a few
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weeks of training. Other tools included a screen painter
and report gpnprator. A screen painter allows easier
configuration of a data formatted screen. Additional
benefits are ease of change and proper spacing for ease of
use. A report generator assists the extraction of data for
reports from specific files. These tools can speed up the
production of code.
Of particular importance to NMPC and the
prototyping methodology was the portability of APSCOBOL
between different types of hardware. By using APSCOBOL, a
prototype could be developed during the hardware procurement
process with the knowledge that whatever hardware was
purchased, the prototype would be able to function on it.
There was definite risk taken by NMPC by using the first
version of APSCOBOL. It is a notorious fact that the
original version of most any piece of software contains bugs
and it is safer to wait for the next version, where the bugs
have been corrected.
d. Deployment of the Prototype
The prototype vastly improved the assignment
process. Users became so dependent on the system that when
it was time for the developers to take the working model and
finish the rest of the development steps, NMPC-47 management
gave into user pressure for immediate implementation of
OAIS.
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The tendency to implement the prototype is a
strong and dangerous one [Ref. 13:p. 63]. Problems that
this will cause cover both the immediate and long term life
cycle management activities. Recall that prototype emphasis
is on the output, not the internal workings of the system.
Inefficient algorithms, error handling procedures,
inadequate interfaces with other systems, and poor user
documentation are a few of the possible immediate problems.
In the long term, mainter'ince and modification of the system
will be difficult. Ineffi-ient use of computer resources
will come into play, incom.lete system documentation will
make incorporation of changes frustrating and the changes
will take a longer period of time [Ref. 14:p. 2]. Of
particular note are changes desired by the second generation
of users [Ref. 13:p. 63]. Second generation users are those
users not around to see the vast difference between the
manual system and the automated system. Changes requested
by these users will most likely be handled by second
generation developers who are not as familiar with the code
and appropriate reasons for handling certain situations as
they are.
To guard against implementation of the
prototype, project management should state at the start of
the project what the development procedures will be [Ref.
14:p. 2]. By providing this guideline and educating the
users as to the benefits of proper design, test and
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implementation, a better computer system, in both the short
and long term, is possible.
Problems with implementation of the prototype
first became evident as OAIS was implemented in the Aviation
and Submarine Departments. The lack of user documentation
caused OAIS utilization problems. Training is an integral
part of the implementation procedures for a computer
application. Users that are not prepared beforehand with
training and user documentation are soon frustrated and
often times do not use the application. There had been no
problem with OAIS within the Surface Department due to their
working knowledge of the system which was acquired during
their assistance with development. A training officer
billet was established and filled in the summer of 1984.
The first user's manual was produced in January 1985, over
two years after the implementation of the prototype.
e. Poor Documentation
One of the problems cau by implementation of
the prototype is the poor quality or lack of documentation.
The following has been noted from report prepared by
SYSCON corporation concerning documentation efforts in
prototyping efforts:
... formal written documentation takes a poor second to the
exciting, more visual simulation of new prototype
software. Often, by the time it is understood how badly
good, careful documentation is needed, the people who
could write it best are gone. [Ref. 15:p. 5]
Without documented requirements, interpretation replaces
detailed definition. Developers interpret users' stated
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requirements. Subsequent modification to functionality is
interpreted by new users' in relation to the operating
software system. The process moves ever further from
objective to subjective. [Ref. 15:p. 5]
The lack of user documentation and its effects
have already been discussed. Modifications and enhancements
have not occurred to OAIS yet, but it is fairly safe to-
predict that problems will occur due to a lack of system
documentation and updated system requirements.
f. Suggested Pre-Implementation Activities
Any change within an organization needs to be
planned for and managed closely. Individuals resist change
for a variety of reasons. These reasons include fear of the
unknown, avoidance of uncertainty, additional pressures and
loss of individual security [Ref. 9:p. 37]. Past ways of
doing business, daily habits and routines are a part of an
individual's security because they are predictable. There
is a loss oi the prior "comfort zone,' which contributes to
an individual's sense of values and view of themselves [Ref.
9: p. 163].
Two criteria are recommended for minimizing
resistance to change. These are education of personnel and
user participation in the planning and decision process
[Ref. 16:pp. 94-95]. Education of personnel establishes
effective lines of communication and decreases speculation
and rumors. The longer personnel have to speculate about an
upcoming change, without being provided official
information, the more likely it is that resistance will
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emerge 'Ref. 9:p. 163]. Having open lines of communication
gives personnel someone to go to with questions and
concerns. Education provided to individuals should include
schedules, plans, both short and long term, and their
probable consequences [Ref. 16:pp. 94-95].
It is more likely that acceptance of the change,
as well as an assurance of the application meeting user
needs, will be accomplished by involving personnel in the
planning process. Personnel that are involved are more
likely to display interest and feel a sense of ownership.
This is likely to lead to increased motivation and
understanding [Ref. 9:p. 163]. Additionally, in a sense,
management has added people to its point of view for the
need and understanding for chanqe. Personnel involved with
the change can spread good information, not rumor, among
fellow workers.
In addition to education of users, all levels of
management should be made aware of the upcoming changes
(Ref. 16:p. 132]. This awareness will increase both support
of the new idea and perhaps bring out possible loopholes
missed up to this point. With all management levels
speaking the party line and understanding the reasons for
change, increased acceptance will be the benefit.
An organization is composed of flows of
information, personnel and material [Ref. 9:p. 29]. The
implementation of OAIS affected all three of these factors.
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The flow of information went from manual to automated. The
personnel interacted with throughout the course of a
business day changed as well as how the material was
produced. Different material was also produced. Automated
reports, one of the outputs of OAIS, were now sources of
information.
Taking into consideration the two criteria
useful in minimizing resistance to change; there was
participation of some users (all from the Surface
Department) in the decision making and modeling of the
prototype, but no education of current or future users.
This participation in the prototyping process did foster a
sense of ownership and additional motivation within the
users. Training was not necessary for these personnel.
This first implementation in the Surface Department set a
bad precedent for NMPC-47 management and created a false
sense of security.
It was not until basic problems with using OAIS
were discovered upon subsequent implementations that
management realized education of users was a necessity. In
addition, the lack of education for the personnel in the
Information Systems Support branch and Order Support branch
concerning the department's changing direction was a
deterrent to acceptance of change. Information Systems
Support branch personnel were busy maintaining the current
manually-oriented systems. They were not consulted on the
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details of the new systems, nor invited to meetings. These
were the people familiar with the systems which would
interface with OAIS as well as those with the intimate
knowledge on order writing, the primary objective of OAIS.
Without their support and indeed the criticism they heaped
on OAIS, the resistance of the users who still interfaced
with these personnel grew.
After implementation of OAIS, many users
continued in their manual-oriented routine patterns of
decision making, order verification and interface with
personnel in the assignment process chop chain. If top
management within the division such as the Submarine
Department, took an active interest, it was more likely that
OAIS usp replaced some manual work. One user had not even
turned the computer on. It was not until individual
attention was paid to each person or group, that grudging
acceptance came. "Tender loving care" was called for to get
past the resistance and onto understanding and comfort with
OAIS. This was accomplished by establishment of a training
officer billet. Establishment of this function was a
reaction instead of a planned event. If training of users
had been planned upfront along with the software development
and hardware procurement, OAIS acceptance would have
happened much quicker within the command.
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C. CASE STUDY TWO TEACHING NOTE
1. Questions
Does project management work well with this
organization structure? Why or why not? What changes
would you recommend?
Are you satisfied with LT Hopkins' management of the
OAIS project?
Is the new version of OAS going to work properly? Why
or why not?
2. Case Summary
This case addresses the timeframe of October 1985
through May 1986 for acti% ties within NMPC-47. A new
project officer for OAIS has just taken over the project.
Personnel changes are al- taking place within the
contractor's OAIS project staff. The primary activity
during this time is development of a new version of OAIS.
The major changes involved are conversion of the software
from the original version of APSCOBOL to a new version, 1.7,
and a newly designed orderwriting module. The team of
personnel responsible for tnis new version is a combination
of contractor and Navy Data Processing Technicians.
3. Major Issues/Problems
- Implementation of matrix structure on organization.
- New project officer and project officer style of
management.
- Heavy reliance on contractors.
- OAIS development team combination of contractor and
Navy personnel.
- Lack of planning for pre-implementation activities.
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4. Case Analysis
a. Nolan's Stages of Growth
NMPC-47 has moved up the growth curve with its
evolving computer application. The changes to OAIS put NMPC
in the Growth of Information Systems stage. Characteristics
of this stage are having the excess computer capacity
characteristic of the Start Up pnase being used up quickly,
and making investments in additional hardware and software.
This contagious enthusiasm of users and computer personnel
results in uncontrolled growth. OAIS users have become
somewhat sophisticated in usage of the application and have
requested enhancements. The Systems Administration division
has just received its first computer and additional
peripheral equipment is on the way. [Ref. ll:pp. 672-673]
b. Project Management
Project Management is ar ongoing process
throughout the life cycle of a computer application by which
a team leader (project officer) directs the team in the
development of an acceptable syster which meets user
requirements and that is produced within the allotted time
and budget constraints [Ref. 17:p. 161]. Directing the team
involves using the basic management functions of planning,
organizing, directing and controlling. The key concept
underlying project management is that the project officer is
the single point of integrative responsibility between all
project team members [Ref. 18:p. 4].
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In the OAIS project, the development team would
consist of the contractors, the Navy Data Processing
Technicians in the Application Programming Shop, the
Training Officer in N470, and the various functional
managers such as Systems Administration, Data Administration
and Configuration Management. The integration of all of
these faction's efforts towards development of a new version
of OAIS is LT Hopkins' primary task.
Project Officers' view project management as "a
source of considerable frustration in attempting to execute
their responsibilities in the face of inadequate authority,
misunderstanding, skepticism and even hostile attitudes."
[Ref. 18:p. 17] Frustration results from having to
coordinate various activities with personnel on several
levels within the organization and needing to give effective
direction to personnel that do not report to them in the
formal chain of command [Ref. 18:p. 34]. Within NMPC-47,
project management operates in an organization structured as
a matrix. Resources and taskings go across traditional
organizational lines and the personnel tasked are working
for two bosses, LT Hopkins, the project officer and their
functional manager.
c. Matrix Management
Using a matrix structure is the preferred
arrangement when the following three basic conditions exist
simultaneously within an organization: (1) outside pressure
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for dual focus; (2) pressures for high information
processing capacity; and (3) pressures for shared resources.
A dual focus refers to a situation where two issues are
critical to the organization's survival. In the case of
NMPC-47, the dual focus is for development of OAIS and the
continued manual maintenance of functions required by
assignment and placement personnel. Neither function can be
allowed to overrule the other as they are both critical to
the continued fulfillment of the organization's mission. A
balance of power must be maintained between the two areas
and each issue must be addressed during decision making
especially decisions dealing with costs, schedules, and
personnel. Having pressures for a high information
processing capacity are the result of relatively unstable
and unpredictable demands on the organization. This
unstable condition dictates the need for additional
information processing. The unstable condition in
conjunction with unknown future events, such as
technological advances, environmental rulings and government
regulations, requires consultation with many members in the
organization. These additional personnel involved in
decisions increase the complexity of the decision making and
increase the requirement for additional information
processing. NMPC-47 is in an unstable condition. OAIS has
been developed by contractors and implemented for 330 users.
The Information Systems Support branch, N471, has just
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received its first computer and OAIS has transferred from
the leased machine to the hardware in-house. The first
major change to OAIS, software conversion and enhancement to
the orderwriting module, is underway. NMPC-47 is dealing
with changes in technology as well as supporting 330 OAIS
users and implementing a major change. The expertise of
many personnel located throughout the department is needed
in the decision making process to ensure the continued
smooth operation of OAIS and the development of the OAIS
enhancement. The third condition for a matrix structure is
pressures for shared resources. By sharing resources,
economies of scale are achieved, scarce resources are
available and costs can be decreased. For NMPC-47, the
resources consist of human and computer resources. Of
particular concern are the technically proficient personnel
in the Information Systems Support branch, whose expertise
is needed for assistance with the OAIS enhancement. The
expertise of the Order Support branch personnel concerning
the requirements of officer orders is also needed during the
design of the orderwriting module. [Ref. 19:pp. 13-18]
There are advantages and disadvantages to a
matrix structure. Besides assisting with the above three
conditions, a matrix structure can also create
opportunities. There is the opportunity for growth in
individual knowledge and skills that is not possible in the
traditional organization structure [Ref. 19:p. 103]. With
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the increase in complexity and personnel involved in
decision making comes increased amounts and patterns of
contact between individuals [Ref. 19:p. 104]. This
increased contact increases the requirement for
communication. Communicating with the necessary personnel
takes additional time and enhanced communication skills.
Conflicts between individuals are certain to arise.
Conflicts can be looked at from a positive viewpoint. If
all the personnel involved in a conflict air their opinions
and the assumption is that everyone is working for the
common good of the project, then it may be possible to
arrive at the best solution to a problem [Ref. 19:p. 104].
A decision can not just be made one day to
transition to a matrix structure and the next day do it and
achieve success. The process of the transition doesn't just
involve changes to the organization chart. Changes are also
required in the systems, culture and behavioral patterns of
the personnel involved. The success of a matrix is
dependent on the organization helping the personnel to
understand and function in new ways [Ref. 19:p. 103]. For
the most part, people are brought up in the "one person-one
boss" tradition. Switching over to being responsible to two
bosses often involves stress and uncertainty due to the
possibilities of conflicting interests and loyalty to
functional responsibilities [Ref. 19:p. 18].
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In this case study, NMPC-47 had just made the
switch to the matrix structure. The time was not taken to
educate personnel, management or to prepare the organization
for the change. Development concerns had top priority. A
matrix organization for accomplishment of OAIS project
management was the means to the end. If the time had been
taken to educate those involved, establish procedures and
standards, many of the problems, primarily those concerning
conflicts, could have beeni diminished. Conflicts in
computer system project mL agement can be generated from the
following: project priorities, administrative procedures,
technical opinions, perf'-mance trade-off decisions,
utilization of manpower resources, cost, schedules,
personality and intensity of work required according to the
phase of the life cycle that the project is in [Ref. 18:p.
46].
Conflict can be minimized by the managerial
behavior of the project officer. Managerial behavior
concerns approaching functional managers with flexibility,
understanding of both sides of an issue and by avoiding
absolute statements of requirements [Ref. 19:p. 51].
Project officers must rely heavily upon their interpersonal,
group management, and communication skills to influence
people to do what is essential for project success. When
project officers are dealing with their peers within an
organization, Stanley Davis and Paul Lawrence suggest that
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they determine how the other person operates and with this
knowledge establish an individual relationship with each of
the different personnel on the project [Ref. 19:p. 88].
In particular, for development of a computer
application, the three areas most likely to cause conflicts
are priorities, manpower resources and schedules [Ref. 18:p.
53]. Each of the functional managers has his/her own
schedules, priorities and workload which must be fulfilled.
It is a given that the original plans and schedule will
change as the project is developed. Each computer project
will be different, will be developed by a different team of
personnel and, in particular, the unexpected can occur when
dealing with new technology. By keeping personnel involved
with the project as up to date as possible, the project
officer can lessen the surprises and crisis situations which
lead to conflicts.
In addition to managerial behavior, the
establishment of interpersonal influence bases are helpful
to a project officer in performing his/her job. Three
influence bases suggested by Russel- D. Archibald are: (1)
reward and punishment power; (2) exprrt power; and (3)
referent power. Reward and punishment power involves having
the power to either block or facilitate the attainment of
personnel or career goals of the people working on the
project. Expert power refers to the expertise of the
project officer concerning the specific topic or project.
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Expert power is conferred on the project officer if the
personnel feel he/she has greater expertise than they do in
the subject matter or that he/she is more qualified to make
decisions than they. Referent power is when the personnel
are personally attracted to the project officer and value
that relationship and the project officer's opinion of them.
Personal friendships and alliances can become an important
source of influence for a project manager. If a project
manager is personally disliked, he many have negative
referent power, which will make the task of influencing
the project contributors even more difficult. [Ref.
18:pp. 45, 44-45]
d. LT Hopkins' Management
LT Hopkins did not integrate the efforts of the
project team members in the project. Functional managers
and team personnel continued on with their functional
responsibilities, but there was no team effort working on
making the OAIS project a success. For example, personnel
in the Information Systems Support branch, N471, where the
Systems Administration and Configuration Management
functions are located, were not invited to meetings nor
consulted or apprised of OAIS plans. The Training Officer
was also not involved in the development of OAIS. Changes
being made to OAIS were of particular importance to the
Training Officer, but this information was not available
until a month before implementation of the new system. The
most significant lack of coordination occurred with the
combination Navy and contractor programmer team. The two
groups were working on separate portions of OAIS,
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orderwriting and software conversion respectively, but
coordination of their progress, scheduling of computer time,
and planning for the eventual combination of their two
programs was not done.
LT Hopkins was a new project officer and many
knowledgeable personnel had left the OAIS project, but that
does not excuse her disregard for acceptable managerial
behavior. Cooperation with LT Hopkins may have been more
forthcoming if she had approached the functional managers in
N471 first as a courtesy measure in regards to tasking their
manpower or need for a schedule change. LT Hopkins did not
have good interpersonal relationships with the functional
managers. Her aggressive manner and "I want it done now"
attitude contributed to the problem. Thus, she reduced her
effectiveness and was not able to build a power base from
which to launch the project. Assistance was available if
she had only asked for it from her peers responsible for
portions of functional management. In particular, CDR Hazel
was an acknowledged functional expert on OAIS. The ability
to build an expert power base by becoming an functional
expert on the OAIS system was available to LT Hopkins. She
did not make an effort to acquire the knowledge. If she
had, in addition to building her expert power base, she
would hdve been able to ask some intelligent questions
throughout the OAIS development process. From this she may
have been able to identify some of the problems prior to
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implementation. The third power base, that of reward and
punishment power, was not available to LT Hopkins due to the
inadequate implementation of the matrix structure in the
organization. Personnel affected by the two boss situation
did not view tasking by LT Hopkins on the same level as
tasking by their functional boss.
There are several factors which may have
contributed to LT Hopkin's poor performance as a project
officer. One factor was the mindset of the project officers
in regard to the contractor. The mindset was, "We are
paying big bucks for a quality product." Therefore, LT
Hopkins did not have any indication that more involvement
with the contractor was necessary than that of her
predecessor. In the history of OAIS, the contractors had
been taken at their word concerning all aspects of systems
development and production. The contractors had not been
wrong yet, which was one of the reasons that the OAIS
reputation was good with both users and management.
However, when LT Hopkins reported aboard, NMPC-47's project
officer and the project manager for the contractor both
left. This left just a handful of personnel familiar with
OAIS functions and history involved with the project.
Additionally, with OAIS documentation of poor quality, there
were no references to turn to for assistance with problem
solving. Lastly, previous development efforts and project
managers did not have to contend with relationships with
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training, systems administration or configuration
management. These functions had not existed then. This may
explain some of the lack of inclusion of Information Systems
Support branch personnel in OAIS planning.
e. Pre-Implementation Problems
Pre-implementation activities typically involve
the testing of the program, and training for users and
operators. Testing of the program can be broken down into
four types of testing. There is individual module testing
or unit testing, to ensure that the internal workings of the
module, the data structures, error handling routines, and
the input and output parameters work properly. Next is
integration testing. This is where all the individual
modules are combined and tested for proper interfaces and
data passing and their ability to work together. The third
test is a system test. This test includes all the factors
that make up a system, the hardware, software, peripheral
equipment, people and procedures. This test is to ensure
that all factors work together and perform their allocated
function. The fourth test is validation of the system.
Validation is a check to ensure that the customers' original
requirements of what the system is supposed to do are
fulfilled. The second major pre-implementation activity is
user and operator training. User training consists of two
parts--provision of formal user documentation on how the
system works and "hands-on" training. "Hands-on" training
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is the actual usage of the computer application. Users
become familiar with both the computer itself and the
application implemented on the computer. Users that are
trained before implementation are much more likely to accept
the new system and be less frustrated when things go wrong.
Operator training is the training of the production control
and scheduling personnel concerning new procedures for
running batch jobs. Having operators familiar with new job
control language, sequencing of jobs and indicators of
smooth running operations is essential for successful
implementation of the new application.
During preparation for the implementation of
OAIS, some training and some testing were completed. User
training was conducted in a conference room with the new
user documentation. "Hands-on" training was not a viable
option due to the lack of a training facility and test
computer application. Individual testing was done on the
modules. This testing was done in the evening due to the
lack of a testing facility on the computer. Integration,
system and validation testing did not take place. Before
OAIS came up, there had never been a complete run-through of
the whole application or system nor validation of what the
application was supposed to do for the users.
f. Development Team
The programming team for development of the OAIS
conversion and orderwriting module consisted of two groups.
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One group was the contractors and their main job was
conversion of the APSCOBOL code from version JK to version
1.7. The other group, made up of Navy Data Processing
Technicians (DP's), was responsible for coding the newly
designed orderwriting module. For the most part, the DP's
were experienced programmers. There was a reason behind
this integrated programming team. The reason was that
maintenance of OAIS would be the Navy's responsibility once
this version of OAIS was implemented. By having the DP's
participate in the prograr ing, they would gain some
valuable experience with the language. Unfortunately, there
was no coordination amonc the programming teams. For the
most part each worked in isolation. The code the
contractor's were converting would be interfacing with the
new orderwriting module in several situations. The two
would be passing data for order generation over an interface
as well as creating batch reports. The lack of testing is
unexcusable.
D. CASE STUDY THREE TEACHING NOTE
1. Questions
- What accounts for the failure of OAIS?
- What does CDR Griffin mean when he says "project office
people always seem to forget the production portion of
this business"?
- If you were LT Hopkins, what would you do when the new
version is taken out of production?
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2. Case Summary
This case study covers the timeframe immediately
following the implementation of the new version of OAIS.
The attitude and thoughts of NMPC-47 management are
described. Reactions to the failure, and procedures to
guard against problems happening in the future are
addressed. A major manpower cut by OP-01 causes a change to
the maintenance plans and contract management for OAIS.
3. Major Issues/Problems
- Project Management in a poorly implemented matrix
structured organization.
- Lack of testing.
- Lack of concern for production issues.
- LT Hopkins's actions.
4. Case Analysis
a. Causes of OAIS failure
(1) Project Management. Russell Archibald
states that the following six causes are the reasons for the
poor performance on projects [Ref. 18:p. 10]:
- Poor understanding of the project manager job.
- Wrong type of person assigned as project manager.
- Excessive conflict between project and functional
managers.
- No integrated planning and control.
- Rapidly changing and conflicting project priorities.
- Improperly organized and staffed project offices.
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The first four of these causes apply to the OAIS failure.
These four problems can be attributed to the poor
introduction of the matrix structure for OAIS project
management in NMPC-47. Without education of personnel
involved in the change to a matrix structure and the
subsequent change to procedures, and behaviors, there will
be a poor understanding of the project manager job.
Personnel tasked by LT Hopkins did not feel that her tasking
was of equal importance as tasking from their functional
managers. Being a project manager requires competence in
working with people, force of personality and skills in
group management [Ref. 19:p. 87]. By choosing a project
manager who lacks these skills and relationships, the job is
put in jeopardy of failing. Influencing functional managers
and negotiating for the success of the project are a large
part of the job. LT Hopkins lacked the interpersonal skills
necessary to both motivate people and to facilitate project
tasking. In particular for NMPC-47, by LT Hopkins lacking
these skills, the problems inherent from the incomplete
introduction of the matrix structure in the organization
were magnified. These problems were evident in the
excessive conflict between the functional managers and the
project officer. LT Hopkins resorted to an aggressive style
and by issuing absolute statements. The mandating of
absolutes is a condition that Stanley Davis and Paul
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Lawrence state is detrimental to working within the matrix
structure.
The lack of integrated planning and control
of the project development team is the underlying reason for
the failure. This lack of integrated planning and control
is particularly evident in the lack of coordination between
the two different parts of the programming team. This lack
of control led to a lack of integration and systems testing
which ultimately caused OAIS to fail. The lack of
integrative planning and control was also evidenced by not
including Information Systems Support branch personnel in
OAIS development planning. With the inclusion of all
personnel whose expertise is needed to assist with the
development of OAIS, a lot of problems could have been
identified earlier in the project development.
(2) Lack of Testing. The primary cause, on the
surface, of the OAIS failure, was the degraded systems
performance caused by the converted code. The system slowed
response time for user requests. This situation was allowed
to continue for two days until user complaints were so
numerous that top management could not ignore them. The
users had become dependent on OAIS for production of their
everyday work. They were unable to do their jobs for two
days. When the new version of OAIS was taken down, there
was another day of computer unavailability. A total of
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three days were lost, an unnecessary consequence due to a
lack of testing prior to implementation.
(3) Organization Inexperience. NMPC-47 is
relatively new in the automated data processing business.
In addition to project officer problems and poor matrix
introduction to the organization, NMPC-47 is making mistakes
because of inexperience. The contractors, who had
implemented the original version of OAIS did not see the
need for more testing of the application. NMPC-47 had not
had to question the contractor previously and did not know
any differently.
b. Lack of Concern for Production Issues
CDR Griffin's comment concerning how the project
office people always seem to forget the production side of
the business can be construed to indicate a lack of integra-
tion. CDR Griffin's comment acknowledges the management
emphasis in NMPC-47, both past and present, which is on
development. With over 300 users dependent on OAIS,
maintaining production OAIS should have been of equal
importance to enhancement of the application. To ensure
proper addressing of production issues, N471 personnel
should have been included in OAIS plans and decision making.
c. LT Hopkins Management Changes
LT Hopkins advocated two changes to the
management of the OAIS application. She wanted OAIS
modularized into smaller portions and test plans to be drawn
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up for each screen, module, program and interface of OAIS.
These two changes were good decisions.
Having OAIS broken down into smaller modules
will facilitate testing, detection and correction of errors.
Error detection and correction is made easier as the code
that needs to be debugged is localized instead of being
spread through out the program. Also by having a smaller
portion of code to test, programs can be debugged more
thoroughly (Ref. 20:p. 131]. Modularization also provides
for the evolvability of the software [Ref. ll:p. 697]. If a
change needs to be made, the module can be coded and
inserted in the program with a minimum of effort and changes
to other interfacing modules.
By mandating test plans for each screen, module,
program and interface, there will be assurance that
integrative and validation testing have been performed.
Additionally, having the users involved in conducting the
test plans will increase their confidence in the new system
and assist with their training on changes contained in the
new version.
One recommended change, that of having one group
in control and responsible for the programming phase, was
taken care of by the manpower cuts. This manpower cut laid
the framework of the future for NMPC-47. NMPC-47 will now
be dependent on contractors for development and maintenance
of their computer applications. This change affected the
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management of the entire life cycle, in particular adding
additional costs for contractor resources to ensure the
continued operation of OAIS. An additional recommendation
is that if LT Hopkins continues her mode of operation of
being the sole interface with the contractor, she should
become more of a functional expert on OAIS and user
requirements.
E. CASE STUDY FOUR TEACHING NOTE
1. Questions
- What are indicators c maturity in NMPC-47?
- What is the structure of the IS organization?
- Will the OAIS imple: -tation be a success?
2. Case Summary
This case study describes the activities of NMPC-47
during the time period of May 1986 through May 1987. The
primary activity taking place is the redevelopment of a new
version of OAIS. Changes within tl- organization include
transition from a development-oriented department to a
production-oriented department wit an emphasis on customer
support. OAIS usage has increased. There are more
terminals available than there are ports on the bus
interface units connected to the local area network. OAIS
users have become more comfortable with OAIS and in Lne
process discovered unprotected data fields and ways to use
OAIS information and screens that were not intended.
Lessons learned from the implementation in May 1986 of OAIS
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are applied to this implementation effort. A systems stress
test is planned and executed. Test Plans are used for
integration and validation tests.
3. Maior Issues/Problems
- Maturity of OAIS.
- Centralization of computing resources.
- User sophistication.
- IS organization transition.




a. Nolan's Stages of Growth
NMPC-47 displays characteristics of both the
third and fourth stages of Nolan's Stages of Growth. The
third stage is called Formalizing Control. Characteristics
of this phase that NMPC-47 is exhibiting are growing pains
towards maturity, some centralization of resources and
equipment and an emphasis on processes instead of products.
The growing pains and emphasis on processes is evidenced by
the transition from a development-oriented department to a
production-oriented department. A process of customer
support has developed and it resulted from the consolidation
of several separate products such as hardware repair, error
research and report generation. The fourth stage is called
Realignment and Integration of Processes. Characteristics
of this stage that apply to NMPC-47 include user
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sophistication and stability of operations. [Ref. ll:pp.
673-674]
(1) OAIS Maturity. The recognition of the
usefulness of OAIS information has grown. Requests for
access to OAIS are received from other commands. OAIS is
not viewed as just facilitating the lives of assignment and
placement officers within NMPC, but as being important to
personnel planning activities external to NMPC. Recognition
of the importance of OAIS information has personnel within
NMPC competing for access to the application. There are
more terminals than there are bus interface units on the
local area network. Primary and secondary users are
designated and specific ports are assigned to primary users.
Competition for ports has caused port pirating.
Considerable administrative time is spent solving the port
pirate problems of users phoning the OAIS Help Desk.
Assignment and placement officers had
relied on OAIS for quite some time. Now user top management
is also depending on OAIS generated information to do their
job. In recognition of the increasing reliance on OAIS,
OAIS Help Desk personnel were required to inform NMPC-47 top
management, and the Admiral in NMPC-4, whenever there was a
major problem with OAIS. Also, CDR Griffin established the
NMPDS Crisis Management Team. The make-up of the team,
technic-! personnel from N471, was a statement supporting
the production-orientation of the branch.
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(2) Centralization of Resources. Computer
operations are fairly stable. There are time and resources
available to address production-oriented issues such as
security, and customer support. A new security system is
implemented, a test OAIS application is implemented and a
dial-up capability for OAIS users out in the field is
implemented.
The implementation of the new security
system, in essence a shell surrounding the entire NMPDS
application, is also evidence of planning for the future
integration of the four applications within NMPDS. The need
for a test application was evident during the previous
implementation attempt. It is available now due to the
availability of additional computer resources and a planning
for the future of OAIS within the command. The dial-up
capability 4.s an enhancement ti the customer support
process. The customer support process is also enhanced with
the consolidation of all user support functions into the
OAIS Help Desk. Previously the separate products of error
research, hardware repair and OAIS status information were
handled by separate divisions within N471. With the
consolidation of all user support resources into a central
agency, the customer is served more efficiently and
effectively.
(3) User Sophistication. OAIS users are very
comfortable with the system. With this comfort comes
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exploration (hacking) of the program. Unprotected data
fields are discovered, screens are used for purposes for
which they were not intended and information contained
within the system is used for personal benefit. Examples of
these unintentional uses are the Aviator's use of a screen
for their internal phone list that was originally designed
for the Submarine Department, and the review of personal
information on doctors and lawyers before using their
services.
With user sophistication and additional
computer resources, application development has been
enhanced. This has resulted in increased usage of the On-
line Adhoc Information System (ODIS) and electronic mail
applications. ODIS is a database system which users may
access with a little training on boolean algebra. ODIS
provides reports and information in a customized format, and
a query capability. The current use of electronic mail is
sporadic across the Distribution Division, but several
departments have started relying on it for internal
messages.
b. Information Systems Department Structure
There are three primary functions that are
typically performed by a Information Systems department.
These are development, maintenance and production control.
Development is concerned with the analysis, design,
programming, testing, documentation, project management and
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implementation cf new applications. Maintenance is
concerned with the continued operation of current
applications. Production control deals with the processing
of daily operations, such as updates, report generation and
output, which are necessary for the continued viability of
the computer applications. Two support functions are also
necessary within an Information Systems department:
administrative and technical support. The administrative
function deals with planning, budgeting and personnel. The
technical support function addresses systems programming,
communications control, system monitoring, technical
assistance, user assistance and data processing standards.
[Ref. 21:p. 90]
The Information Systems department, NMPC-47,
transitions from a development-oriented to a production-
oriented organization. As an information systems department
matures, its operations become more important. This
importance is due to the resources, in the form of
personnel, equipment and software, which are needed for the
continued support of computer systems in the organization.
Once an application has been implemented and integrated into
the operational routine of the organization, it cannot be
discarded nor changed drastically due to user dependence.
[Ref. 20:p. 46]
Prior to this transition, N470, the Information
Systems Development branch, was responsible for management
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of all three primary functions and parts of both support
functions. This was accomplished through a matrix
structure. Development was handled through contractors with
liaison between the contractors and the Navy in the form of
a project officer in N470. Maintenance was accomplished by
the Application Programming Shop in N470, while the need for
the maintenance was determined in N471 and N472. Project
officers in N470 determined production control priorities
while the personnel doing the production control work were
located in N471. Refer to Figure 3 in Case Study Two.
This matrix ma. gement caused conflicts over
work priorities, chain of command, and usage of personnel
resources. Whenever there was a problem with production
OAIS, LT Perkins at the OAIS Help Desk had to consult with
LT Hopkins. In addition to wasting time, LT Hopkins was not
fully aware of the impact of certain production problems on
the users of OAIS. CDR Griffin and cDR Kice, branch heads
for N471 and N470 respectively, also had conflicts over
allocation of resources and develo -ient versus production
priorities. With the priorities of the project management
personnel taking precedence over those of production and
technical support, both system readiness and the morale of
personnel was low.
Once the transition of responsibility for
production decisions was made from N470 to N471, the
responsibility for the three primary functions and two
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secondary functions was more evenly divided between the two
departments. Refer to Figure 4 in Case Study Four. The
Information Systems Development branch, N470, continued to
have responsibility for application development. Their
responsibility for maintenance was a temporary requirement
until the new version of OAIS was implemented. The
Information Systems Developmnt branch, N470, had
responsibility for only one support function, the
administrative function. Systems Administration in N471
took over full responsibility for the production control
function and some of the technical support functions such as
systems programming, systems performance monitoring and
configuration. Other technical support activities were
handled by Configuration Management and the OAIS Help Desk.
Configuration Management was responsible for technical
assistance and data processing standards. The OAIS Help
Desk, Training and personnel in N472 were responsible for
user assistance.
Customer service is one of six critical areas
needing management control to ensure continued efficiency
and effectiveness of the computer systems [Ref. 20:p. 62].
Afterall, the computer system is for the users. The move of
the training function from N470 to N471 and the
consolidation of responsibility for all customer contact
into the OAIS Help Desk facilitated the development of a
total customer service concept. The main idea was to
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provide one-stop shopping for the users. Prior to this
consolidation, users had to call Error Research if they had
a problem with officer orders, or call Systems
Administration if there was a problem with the computer
hardware or a printer, or call Production Control if there
was problem with receipt of a report. CDR Griffin
recognized the need of having one organization responsible
for interface with the users. This consolidation ensured
quicker and better service to the user. The OAIS Help Desk
also assisted in achieving better communications with the
users. Personnel at the OAIS Help Desk called each
department's user representative to pass along important
information concerning an OAIS problem or computer downtime.
A logbook to log all phone calls into the OAIS
Help Desk was established. If a problem was called in
concerning a hardware problem or report problem, a trouble
report was sent to the appropriate part of N471 for
correction. The time was logged and if feedback was not
received at the OAIS Help Desk within a reasonable amount of
time from the appropriate section of N4l responsible for
the correction, follow-up action was taken. This audit
trail ensured that a user's problem would not be overlooked.
Additionally, the logbook provided a composite of user
problems. From this consolidation it was possible to spot
trends- concerning problem prone hardware or frequency of
errors.
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The change of the organization focus to
production issues and customer support brought about changes
to the jobs that the Data Processing Technicians (DP's) had
been performing in NMPC-47. Most DP's want to program.
Most programmers have a job orientation towards systems
development, evcn though the majority of the work is
production and maintenance oriented [Ref. 22:p. 9]. The
DP's experienced the maturity of the organization by seeing
it progress from an organization where the focus was
computers and programming to an organization where the user
and user desires were of utmost importance. The DP's that
worked on the OAIS Help Desk resented being put in the
position of answering the phone and dealing with frustrated
users. The glamourous positions in their eyes were those of
Systems Administration and the Information Center in N470.
One factor that may have assisted in facilitating this
change in direction in the organization would have been
clear-cut, mappe -out career paths for the DP's. Employees
are motivated when there is a clearly-defined relation
between performance, recognition and advancement [Ref. 23:p.
42]. Instead of having advancement and transfer up to the
discretion of top management, with their decisions based
upon past performance cf personnel, designated career paths
should have been established. When career paths are
documented, personnel are motivated, recruited and trained
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in accordance with their desires for promotion [Ref. 23:p.
41].
c. Pre-Implementation Activities
(1) Lessons Learned. One of the major problems
identified with the implementation of OAIS in May 1986 was
the lack of testing. In May 1986 there had been no
integrative, system, nor validation testing conducted. All
four types of testing were conducted for this implementation
effort. One of the reasons for the lack of testing was lack
of a test application. A test application was available for
this implementation effort. Also, in the previous implemen-
tation, the programming team was a combination of Navy Data
Processing Technicians and contractor personnel. Having two
groups responsible for the programming required a lot of
coordination and planning. For this implementation, all
programming was done by the contractors. After the failure
of the OAIS implementation in May 1986, LT Hopkins said she
wanted test plans made up for every screen, program, and
module of OAIS. These test plans were created by the
contractor and reviewed by appropriate Navy personnel.
(2) Testing. A system stress test was
scheduled for a Friday afternoon in February. An
insufficient number of users participated for NMPC-47 to be
sure how the system would react when a full load of users
were using the system. Due to the Information Systems
department being on tile same level as the users in the
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organization, CAPT Williams was able to intercede with the
Admiral of NMPC-4 and his fellow department heads and get
full user participation for a second systems stress test.
Individual module testing was done by the
contractors. When the new project manager for the
contractor, V. Hammer, came on-board, her first concern was
for the lack of interface (an aspect of integrative testing)
testing between OAIS and its interfacing systems. Interface
testing became one of her priorities. The interface which
she had no control over was the Order Production Module
(OPN)-OAIS interface. The OPM was still under development
at the time of interface testing. This status concerned
both V. Hammer and LT Hopkins. Each took the matter to
their immediate boss, but to no avail.
Validation testing utilizing the test plans
and OAIS user representatives was scheduled for the six
weeks prior to implementation. Validation testing was
conducted every afternoon for these six weeks. Problems
detected were prioritized either for correction prior to
implementation or after implementation. The contractor had
only the morning hours before each testing session to work
on corrections to the problems. One of the problems
identified with new system implementation is having
inadequate time to test [Ref. 13:p. 123]. This was
definitely the situation with the OAIS implementation. All
the personnel involved with the testing, contractors, LT
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Hopkins, LT Perkins, and CDR Hazel did not think OAIS was
ready for implementation. There were too many problems
which needed to be fixed prior to implementation in addition
to the lack of testing of the OAIS interface with the OPM.
During the OAIS validation testing, more
emphasis and personnel were added to the OPM project on both
the Navy and contractor teams. The addition of extra people
to a project has been shown to decrease productivity for a
short time. The decreased productivity is due to time
needed to train personnel, familiarize them with the project
and the increased amount c time spent on communication
between project members.
(3) TraininQ. Training of users and operators
of the computer systems is also an important part of pre-
implementation. Training for the users was increased over
the last implementation try. Users were kept informed of
changes to OAIS by way of OAIS User Bulletins and their user
representatives. An updated OAIS U- r Manual was
distributed. The user representatives were the users that
participated in the validation test ;. Through their
exposure to the new system, they would be able to assist
other users in their departments. The OAIS Help Desk
personnel also were trained by having access to the test
system in the early morning hours before the contractors
used it to correct the software problems discovered in the
validation testing. Full scale, "hands-on" training of
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users did not take place due to non-availability of the test
application during normal working hours.
Operator training was planned to occur by
having contractor personnel in Scheduling every night during
the first few weeks of the new implementation. This would
familiarize Scheduling personnel with the new procedures and
potential problems.
(4) Method of Conversion. There are four
methods by which an organization can convert to a new
computer system: direct cutover, parallel conversion,
staged conversion and pilot system. Direct cutover is when
conversion takes place all at once. The old system is
terminated and the new one is put in operation immediately.
Direct cutover was the method chosen in the May 1986 OAIS
implementation. There are risks to this method. The
primary one being that if a major problem is discovered with
the new system, it may cause some computer downtime for the
organization. Advantages to this method include a lack of
transition costs, and psychologically, users may try harder
to work with the new application when there is nothing for
them to fall back on. Transition costs are those costs in
resources (personnel, computer time) incurred from running
two systems at the same time. [Ref. ll:p. 737]
With parallel conversion, both the new and
old systems are operated in parallel. The advantages to
this method are that the old system is there to rely on in
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case problems do develop with the new system. Disadvantages
include the additional costs in resources of running and
updating two systems. Staged conversion is essentially the
replacement of the old system with the new system in a
gradual manner. The advantage to this method is having the
new capabilities of the new version while still retaining
the flexibility to cope with any problems. The last method
is by use of a pilot system. The new version is implemented
in only one division within the organization. This
minimizes the risk to the entire organization and also
provides lessons learned to facilitate implementation in
other parts of the organization. [Ref. ll:p. 736]
NMPC-47 chose parallel conversion for this
implementation of OAIS. They possessed the additional
computing capacity and willingness to take on the additional
costs of resources to maintain both the old and new
versions. There were several reasons for their choice of
parallel conversion. OAIS users had a significant amount of
work already completed in OAIS which would have had to be
redone in the new system. It was determined that this would
be detrimental to user service and user confidence. Also,
in light of the implementation problems in May 1986, there
would be a system to fall back on without any system
downtime for the users. To ensure that users did not
continue to use the old system unless they had previous work
in OAIS JK, several of the screens were disabled.
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(5) Conclusions. NMPC-47 improved their pre-
implementation planning and activities. More thorough
testing procedures were established and followed, covering
all four types of testing necessary to inspect all aspects
of new software. Users were involved with the testing
through the use of test plans. More training of both users
and operators was conducted. The ultimate state for
training would include "hands-on" training for all the
users, but this was unavailable to NMPC-47 due to the time
and computer resources needed by the contractors to fix
trouble reports discovered during testing. The decision
concerning parallel conversion versus the direct cutover
method was also a more cautious decision taking into account
user workload. The area of testing remained the one problem
of the pre-implementation activities. Insufficient time was
allotted for the testing and suasequent fixing of trouble
reports needing fixing prior to implementation.
Additionally, problems still existed with the OAIS-OPM
interface, which was the most crucial of all the OAIS
interfaces because it was responsible for the output of the
application. Insufficient concern was allotted to the OPM
program and when it did become critical, more people were
added to the project, slowing down productivity.
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F. CASE STUDY FIVE TEACHING NOTE
1. Questions
- What caused the OAIS problems?
- What cnanges snouid have been planned?
2. Case Summary
This case describes the problems which occurred
after the re-implementation of OAIS in May 1987. The
majority of problems encountered were with the OAIS-Order
Production Module (OPM) interface. Other problems
associated with the new OAIS were accounting data problems,
missing orders, incorrect orders and difficulties with the
Communication Center. The OPM took the place of AUTONOM.
The software changes this move necessitated were planned
for. The administrative changes, which primarily affected
the production portion of the department, were not planned
for. These changes dealt with maintenance of magnetic
tapes, increased demand for the letter sorter machine and
inadequate reports for tracking of orders. Top management




- Lack of planning.




On the surface, the majority of the problems
with OAIS can be blamed on the interface between OAIS and
the OPM. Problems with this interface were identified
during execution of the test plan. The OPM failed all its
tests, but was implemented anyway. The OPM was identified
as a critical interface approximately three months before
the implementation date. Neither the Navy nor the
contractor project management team increased their effort
until a few weeks before implementation. The additional
personnel added to the project only slowed down
productivity. This was due to the increased time needed to
familiarize the personnel with the project and for
communication among project members.
Developing the OPM was an accomplishment of the
NMPC-47 long-term goal of being responsible for the entire
order production process. The OPM did not just produce
officer orders. It was also responsible for all the jobs
previously accomplished by AUTONOM. AUTONOM had been
responsible for producing the MPN Financial Management
System (MFS) tape sent to Navy Finance Center, Cleveland
with the accounting data and cost of each set of orders.
AUTONOM had generated reports that assisted in the tracking
of orders. AUTONOM had also placed OAIS information in the
proper format for Naval messages or letters. It is obvious
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from top management's decision to implement the OPM, even
though it had failed the test plan, that they were unaware
of all the possible repercussions of implementing the OPM.
Considering the six causes of poor performance
on projects that Russell Archibald has compiled (see Case
Study Three Teaching Note), the overriding general cause of
the OAIS problems was a lack of integrated planning and
control. Again, as in the previous implementation effort in
May 1986, the improperly introduced matrix structure for
project development is the root of the problems encountered.
The project officer focus as on the software changes in
OAIS, not on the changes which would be required of the
entire organization to use the new OAIS. An information
system is not just software. It also includes hardware,
procedures, people and an applicable organization structure.
With a system like OAIS that has far-reaching effects both
on other organizations and on which users are heavily
dependent, additional planning is neced. Additional
planning in the form of establishirq an interface with the
OPM project officer from an early s-ge in the project and
having an integrated project team consisting of development
and production-oriented personnel was needed. These
.asures would have helped to prevent some of the problems.
b. Lack of Planning
An integrated project team could possibly have
foreseen the following production-oriented problems: order
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tracking and accounting, output verification, liaison with
the Communication Center and condition of the letter sorter
machine. The capability of tracking and accounting of
orders could have been built into the reports generated for
the OAIS Help Desk. Personnel performing verification of
OPM output could have been trained and the new job
descriptions could have been viewed with anticipation. An
increase in duties to include liaison with the Communication
Center could have been an increase in responsibility and
morale for personnel at the OAIS Help Desk. With some
advance planning, a good working relationship could have
been established with the Communication Center prior to OAIS
.Lmplementation. Having foreseen possible problems with the
magnetic tapes, a standard run book procedure could have
been established for Scheduling. A new letter sorter o-
supplementary maintenance of the old one could have been
arranged in advance. A contingency plan could have been
developed to provide for breakdowns.
NMPC-47 was faced with both computer-oriented
problems and organization problems due to the implementation
of OAIS. These problems were addressed and dealt with only
in terms of expediency. The civil servants in N472 were
delegated the job of verifying the orders that OAIS
generated. This was an added burden for these personnel and
decreased their morale. Since the letter sorter was down so
often, enlisted personnel had to spend several hours a day
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sorting letters by hand and preparing them for mailing. The
job of liaison with the Communications Center was given to
the OAIS Help Desk. If a problem was discovered with the
daily magnetic tapes, the contractors had to be called to
redo the tape or part of the tape. This took time away from
fixing the software problems.
A problem with OAIS that was not caused due to a
lack of testing were the enhancements made to OAIS JK that
were not a part of OAIS 1.7. These were changes made by the
Applications Programming Shop. These changes were not
documented in the application documentation. Having them
missing from the new version was again an example of a lack
of integrated planning and control.
c. Top Management
Top management of both NMPC-47 and the
contractor got involved to solvc7 the crisis. Meetings were
held three times a week with management and technical
personnel. Top management assigned priorities and due dates
for individual problems. LT Hcpkins was taken out of the
OAIS project. LT Perkins and CDR Hazel took control of day-
to-day activities and correction of OAIS and OPM trouble
reports. Top management became involved in the details of
daily OAIS production and long range plans for correction of
trouble reports. Their computer expertise contributed some
much need direction to the OAIS project. This crisis paved
the way for NMPC-47 management to realize that their
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information systems did not exist in a vacuum. Information
systems had become an integral part of the NMPC mission.
G. CASE STUDY SIX TEACHING NOTE
1. Ouestions
- How do you evaluate CAPT Hampton's changes?
- What are the signs of NMPC-47 maturity?
- How would you deal with the new contractors?
2. Case Summary
This case study addresses the timeframe of May 1987
through November 1987. NMPC-47 is slowly recovering from
the problems generated by implementation of an inadequately
tested application. The focus of the organization is on
regaining user confidence and fixing production-oriented
problems. A new contractor has just been awarded the
maintenance contract for OAIS. A new department head makes
changes in the organization structure and implements changes
to administrative policies. The information systems
organization and its users have matured. Users have an
interest in daily activities and a vote on the priorities of
application enhancements. A steering committee for NMPC-47
is formed to ensure compatibility of future plans for NMPDS
and resource sharing. NMPC-47 has acquired sufficient
functional expertise and computer savvy to be directing




- Integration of infornation system into organization.
- Data is a resource.
- Maintenance.
- Documentation.
- Standards and Quality Assurance.
- User Responsibility.
4. Case Analysis
a. Nolan's Stages of Growth
NMPC-47's information systems and management are
now in the beginning of the Data Resource Function stage,
stage five. Characteristics of this stage exhibited by
NMPC-47 are consideration of data as a resource,
consideration of applications as valuable assets and
integration of information systems into the organization.
Also, managers are experienced in information systems and
computing issues. [Ref. ll:p. 674]
(1) Data is a Resource. The establishment of
the Configuration Control Board (CCB) is an indicator that
NMPC-47 views data as a resource. This board is composed of
functional managers, top management, technical experts and
staff personnel from within NMPC-47. The focus of the CCB
is on planning for the future, ensuring compatibility of
data and requirements for the four applications within NMPDS
and resource sharing. The CCB reviews any changes, both
short and long term, prior to implementation.
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The fact that applications are viewed as
valuable assets in themselves is supported by two factors.
One is the emphasis and time given to maintenance of OAIS.
Placing an emphasis on maintenance expresses an evolutionary
attitude concerning the importance of the information
systems. Maintenance is the gradual upgrading and
implementing of user and technical-oriented changes. This
gradual process provides for economies of scale and long
term efficiencies versus letting the system get outlated and
having the large expense of developing from scratch [Ref.
20:p. 11]. "The updating of existing systems and
capabilities, the balancing of stability with a degree of
change can be an important measure of financial and
operational success and of -he maturity of the organization
itself." [Ref. 20:p. 10]
In addition to maintenance, time is also
needed to regain user confidence in OAIS. This confidence
can be restored by a steady track record of implementing
fixes to problems caused by the OPM and fixes to problems,
such as PRD inconsistencies, that have existed for some
time. By allocating all six contractor personnel to
maintaining OAIS, this goal is possible. Additionally,
allowing for maintenance time gave the new contractors time
to understand the processes and programs of the OAIS
application. This education will help facilitate the
implementation of enhancements in the future. This time for
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education is essential considering the poor condition of
OAIS documentation. There is a cost to this emphasis on
maintenance and re-establishing user confidence and that is
application enhancements. Top management realized that with
a new contractor, poor documentation, disappointed users and
an unsteady OAIS foundation that the chances of problems
with new enhancements, such as the problems experienced with
the activity file, are likely. The benefits of taking this
extra time will pay off in the future when the development
of future enhancements takes less time and resources.
(2) Documenta ion. OAIS documentation had been
of poor quality since the inception of the project in 1982.
Problems caused by this poor quality of documentation had
not been encountered previous to this time for several
reasons. One, the same contractor that had developed the
original documentation and program code, still had
responsibility for the project. Two, the changes being made
to OAIS were primarily centered aro. 3 conversion of the
software version and total redesign of certain interfaces
such as the OPM and orderwriting m. ule. With a new
contractor taking over the OAIS project there was
unfamiliarity with the functions of the application as well
as with the code. Adequately maintained documentation could
have assisted the new contractor, instead of causing them
problems.
Documentation of information processing can provide the
following benefits: (1) content and format guide for
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documentation of data processing procedures, policies,
practices and requirements; (2) complete record of an
information processing system from analysis through
implementation and maintenance; (3) data for simplifying
and facilitating either conversion to new or upgraded
hardware and or software or adoption of a new application;
(4) communication medium for transfer of information.
(Ref. 24:p. 121)
The new contractor's initial tasking was to
correct all the problems with the OPM and production OAIS.
This is where the documentation was needed, to try to
understand the intent and content of the program. It became
evident at this point that the documentation had also not
been kept up-to-date. These prcblems with documentation,
particularly the reporting and recordkeeping fall under the
function of quality assurance.
(3) Standards and Quality Assurance. The
second factor illustrating the organizations's view of the
application as a valuable resource is the emphasis on
standards. Standards for documentation, operating
procedures and programs have existed since the establishment
of N.I'PC-47. Configuration Management was responsible for
making and distributing the policy on standards for
organization and contractor use. Prior to this time period,
however, the organization emphasis was on development. The
extra time was not taken to ensure adherence to standards in
the rush to get an application to the users. Once there was
time, the problem seemed too hard and there were other
pressing matters. It was not until NMPC-47 and the new
contractors themselves experienced problems with the non-
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documented software, that standards became the answer to
their problems.
Standards are important for the following
reasons: they are a basis of communications, so that all
involved are talking the same language, they ensure
compliance with policies and practices and they minimize the
effects of changes [Ref. 24:p. 108]. Standards are a part
of preventive management. Having a quality assurance
function within the project structure in also preventive
management.
Quality assurance comprises a variety of tasks...:
(1) application of technical methods, (2) conduct of
formal technical reviews, (3) testing of software, (4)
enforcement of standards, (5) control of change, (6)
measurement, and (7) recordkeeping and reporting. [Ref.
12:p. 438]
Quality assurance is built into the
functions of an information systems department by the
establishment and documentation of control systems and
procedures which are responsible for monitoring quality
[Ref. 20:p. 151]. NMPC-47 implemented the quality assurance
functions by having the OAIS Help Desk review and certify
the work done by the contractor and by the adherence to
standards. Prior to this period, the work of the contractor
was not verified nor evaluated to ensure compliance with the
standards. A change to production control procedures was
implemented for quality assurance purposes. Production
Control personnel were made responsible for reviewing the
run books and program naming conventions to ensure their
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feasibility and adherence to standards. This review was
required prior to implementation. The review time added a
few days onto the implementation of fixes, but in the long
run would save time by having standardized procedures.
NMPC-47 had a long way to go until quality assurance was a
part of every application and program, but they have started
a program to work towards that 9oal.
Quality assurance and utilization of
standards minimize the effects of change on the application.
Change is inevitable in a computer system. Changes are
needed to correct errcrs, incorporate user requests for
enhancements and to take advantage of technology
advancements [Ref. ll:p. 605]. By minimizing the effects of
change, the quality of maintainability is enhanced.
Maintainability is defined by Roger Pressman as the ease
with which software can be understood, corrected, adapted,
and/or enhanced [Ref. 12:p. 531]. The concept of
maintainability supports the design ion of an application
as a valuable resource and that maintenance is part of an
evolutionary approach to information systems planning.
(4) User Responsibility. The managers of NMPC-
47 are now experienced veterans of information systems
development and computing requirements. A lot of lessons
were learned the hard way and at user expense, but the
experience and lessons learned have been effective. This
growth in expertise is evident in several ways:
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establishment of the CCB, adherence to standards, use of
requirements analysis for OPM fixes, and establishing a
quality assurance review for contractor fixes. Another way
the experience is evident is making the user more
responsible for OAIS. The requirements of training prior to
issuance of a password and mandatory attendance at user
meetings were designed to make the users the driving force
behind OAIS. By requiring the training of all users, NMPC-
47 built user confidence [Ref. 209:p. 54]. This user
education covered all aspects of the application and with
this knowledge comes a sense of ownership, confidence,
responsibility and interest.
b. Organization Changes
When Captain Hampton reported on-board, he made
several changes to the organization structure of NMPC-47.
He further refined NMPC-47 so that its branches were in
alignment with the three functions and two support functions
suggested for an information systems department. These
three functions are development, maintenance and production.
The two support functions are administrative and technical.
A discussion of these areas is in the Case Study Four
Teaching Note.
The customer support task within the technical
support function was centralized further with the move of
Order Support personnel in N472 to N471. The Information
Systems Support branch, N471, now included all customer
149
oriented interfaces. The function of production control was
broken out from under Systems Administration. This move was
in recognition of its importance to the organization. With
this change, problems which had existed for some time were
able to reach top management. One of these problems
involved report distribution and had brought on a Naval
Audit investigation concerning wasted paper. Further, the
lack of adherence to standards was brought out in the open
and the CCB acted on this deficiency. An information
systems policy and procedures branch was created. This
branch contained portions of the technical and
administrative support functions. Configuration Management
and Data Administration were placed in this branch. This
consolidation created a division responsible for controlling
the assessing the applications in NMPDS and planning for
their future.
c. New Contractors
NMPC-47 top management is impressed with the
honesty and technically proficient explanations they receive
from the new contractors, SYSCON. With the decision to put
all six programmers to work fixing production problems, the
active implementation of standards for configuration
management and establishment of a quality assurance
function, NMPC-47 is in an excellent position to ensure the
quality of contractor work. Additionally, these efforts
will assist in returning the OAIS project back to its good
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reputation with the users. By having the CCB performing its
function of ensuring compatibility and resource sharing for
NMPDS and the contractor being required to explain the
reasons behind both short and long term fixes, NMPC-47 has
taken steps to guard against the problems caused by total
reliance on a contractor.
There are two suggestions to ensure the
continued viability of OAIS. One is that as the contractors
progress through fixing production-oriented problems, NMPC-
47 direct them and provide the time and money for updating
the system documentation. rhis will assist with future
implementation efforts and the move toward redesign of OAIS
into a database oriented application. The second suggestion
concerns project management. The OAIS project officer
should acquire some functional expertise with OAIS and
utilize an integrated project development team composed of
production and maintenance technically proficient personnel
for planning future development eff ;s.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. Research Question One
The conclusion, in regard to the first research
question concerning what could have done to prevent the
problems from occurring with OAIS, is still ambiguous.
Prevention of problems like those experienced with OAIS can
only occur through adherence to established standards and
procedures for documentation, testing, and quality
assurance. Following through with these activities
throughout the life cycle of OAIS will facilitate the
implementation of future changes and help ensure that the
maintenance phase tasks are easier. This experience with
OAIS and the subsequent analysis of this case study has
assisted in the identification of possible causes of
problems during information systems development. This
knowledge will be of value in the future to help identify
potential problem situations before they turn into full-
blown problems.
The possible causes of problems pertaining to OAIS
development include the following: (1) acceptance of poor
quality documentation; (2) implementation of the prototype;
(3) failure to adhere to standards; (4) lack of testing; and
(5) lack of quality assurance activities. The problems
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caused by the acceptance of poor quality documentation and
implementation of the prototype had been put in motion by
actions taken at the beginning of the OAIS life cycle.
Documentation is viewed by the majority of software
developers as a peripheral activity. Yet, documentation is
essential for the performance of maintenance activities in
the future. The documentation received on the Officer
Assignment Information System (OAIS) was of poor quality.
In addition, the documentation suffered from a lack of
updating as changes were made and maintenance activities
performed. It was not until a new contract for OAIS
maintenance was awarded in 1987 that the full effects of the
poor quality of documentation were felt by NMPC-47. The
contractors required extra time to understand the OAIS
programs while trying to fix software trouble reports. This
extra time took resources away fr.om implementing user
requested software enhancements.
Implementation of the prototype has been documented
as a dangerous problem when utilizing the prototyping
development methodology. This problem has been noted
particularly in situations where users are unhappy with
their present system. This was the case with NMPC.
Problems had existed with the assignment process -ince the
late 1970's. OAIS drastically improved the assignment
process in comparison to the manual system. NMPC-47 yielded
to user pressure and implemented the prototype. It is easy
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to see why NMPC-47 made the decision to implement the
prototype. Implementation of the prototype was a sensible
public relations move. Users loved OAIS and the publicity
OAIS received within the organization made those departments
that were not on-line yet, want OAIS as soon as possible.
This positive attitude would facilitate future
implementation efforts. Additionally, as prototyping was on
the leading edge of technology, there was little information
concerning the pros and cons of prototype implementation to
guide NMPC-47.
By implementing the prototype, NMPC-47 also set
themselves up for efficiency and maintenance problems in the
future. The prototype is developed rapidly with concern
only for the output, not how the output is generated. There
exists the possibility of compromises and inefficiencies in
the implementation of the inner workings of the prototype.
Though not explicitly stated as reasons for the problems
with the OAIS versions implemented in 1986 and 1987, the
inefficiencies in the development of the original prototype
played a significant role.
2. Research Question Two
A second research question addresses exrlanations
for problems encountered in OAIS implementati n efforts. In
addition to the impact of the implementaticn of the
prototype mentioned above, the underlying factor which
contributed to the problems encountered with both of the
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OAIS implementation efforts in May 1986 and May 1987 was the
project management function.
NMPC-47 managed application development with a
project officer and a matrix structure for liaison between
project management and functional management. The
organization was not properly prepared to accept matrix
management. Personnel must be educated and procedures and
behaviors must be changed in order for the matrix to
function properly. Most people are familiar with the "one
person-one boss" tradition. Switching over to being
responsible to two bosses, in this case a project manager
and a functional manager, involves stress and uncertainty
for the personnel concerned. The project management
function worked successfully in the matrix structure during
the initial development and deployment of OAIS. During this
timeframe a production version of OAIS and involved
functional management did not exist. For the implementation
efforts in May 1986 and 1987, a production version of OAIS
with approximately 330 users and functional management
concerned for its continued operation did exist. This
caused conflicts regarding the scheduling of manpower and
computer resources.
A contributing factor to the implementation problems
was a lack of integrated planning and control by the project
manager for implementation of the new version. The project
manager for OAIS was inexperienced in the software
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development field. Her inexperience combined with a lack of
managerial skills contributed to a lack of integrated
planning and control. One manifestation of this lack of
planning and control was a lack of testing prior to
implementation. In 1986, there was no integration,
validation nor systems test of the entire application. If
these tests had been conducted prior to implementation, OAIS
would not have been implemented. Another factor was a lack
of planning for changes other th-.an software changes caused
by implementation of a new version of OAIS. In May 1987,
NMPC-47 became responsible for the entire order production
process, taking over responsibility for a variety of tasks
dealing with verification and generation of output. These
changes were not planned for and subsequently caused
significant problems within the organization and among the
users.
B. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
This case study dealt with one organization within the
U.S. government. NMPC is a Navy Headquarters command and
the constraints under which it operates may not apply to a
lower-echelon command. Additionally, the computer
application was developed using a prototyping development
methodology and a third generation software language.
Factors and events deemed important usiag this methodology
and software language many not apply to another type of
methodology and software language. A further limitation
156
concerns the distribution of the computer application. OAIS
was developed and utilized in one geographic location for a
centralized group of users. Computer applications developed
for distribution to several commands and spread over several
geographic locations may not encounter the problems and
events stated in this case.
Cf particular note is the contrast between public (U.S.
government) and private industry. The limitations imposed
on the U.S. government inlude budget restrictions, full and
open competition (when apr9icable) and bureaucratic
practices for the approval of change. These practices take
excessive amounts of time Private industry does not
function under the same type of limitations. If changes are
required, they occur rapidly. If a particular product or
company is preferred, private industry can choose it. The
method or solution that a U.S. government agency may invoke
is limited by the above-stated restrictions. The method to
correct a situation such as that of NMPC may differ
depending on whether it is a U.S. g -vernment agency or
private industry.
C. FUTURE RESEARCH
In addition to documenting a situation where the leading
edge of technology was an issue, this case also dealt with
implementation of the computer application and its
associated decisions and problems. The Computer Systems
Management curriculum includes education on software
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development principles and practices. There is little
emphasis on the implementation side of the computer
application. A recommended area for future research is an
analysis of the feasibility of including implementation-
oriented material within the curriculum.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Redesign of OAIS
In accordance with the problems encountered with
prior OAIS implementation efforts, the following
recommendations are suggested for NMPC's redesign of OAIS:
- Ensure complete and up-to-date documentation is
available on OAIS programs and interfaces.
- Utilize development personnel and programmers who are
experienced with the particular database package
chosen.
- Plan for and follow through on extensive testing of all
four types. Plan for testing and error correction to
proceed at a normal workday (eight hours) pace of
operations by allowing extra time for testing.
- Educate and train OAIS users thoroughly prior to
implementation. Hands-on training is the most
effective. If the users comprehend the changes being
made, they will be more tolerant of any errors that may
be detected once the application is implemented.
- Don't let the political pressures of a headquarters
environment allow implementation of an application that
is not ready. This short-term decision will only cause
long-term problems and cost more in terms of resources
in the long run.
2. Case Studies
Very few of the students who come to the Naval
Postgraduate School have had any experience with development
or implementation of computer applications. The basic
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principles and procedures of software development are
included in the curriculum. To a limited extent, some
experience with software development is gained through
experience with group projects. This experience is
primarily in the field of microcomputer applications.
Additional experience, whether real or the simulated
experience of a case study, covering the areas of software
development within the Department of Defense and in a
mainframe/minicomputer environment are needed. This
experience can assist students when they are confronted with
a similar situation once they leave school. One of the
primary figures, the project officer, in this case study was
a Naval Postgraduate School graduate. To ensure that
graduates of the Computer Systems Management curriculum do
not make the same mistakes due to the lack of experience,
there needs to be a stronger emphasis on change and





OAIS interfaces with eight external applications and one
internal (N47-managed) application. The internal computer
system is the On-Line Distribution Information System
(ODIS). ODIS is a database system and uses a Model 204 Data
Base Management System (DBMS). OAIS provides daily or
weekly updates of the personnel, billet and activity files
to ODIS. ODIS does not pass any data back to OAIS.
The Officer Master File (OMF) is the primary repository
of personnel data on all active-duty officers. The OMF is
managed by NMPC-16. Every night an OMF change tape is run
to update OAIS. Changes generated within OAIS during the
day are provided via magnetic tape to update the OMF.
Changes generated within OAIS include PRD changes,
submarine/aviation pay changes, and order information.
The orderwriting system used until May 1987 was AUTONOM.
AUTONOM was managed by NMPC-16. In addition to producing
the officer orders for distribution to the fleet either
through message or letter, AUTONOM also interfaced with the
Officer Master File and the MPN Financial Management System
(MFS).
When AUTONOM was run, it was sorted against the Officer
Master File which verified order number, order modification
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number, and detaching UIC information between OAIS and the
OMF. If what was on OAIS did not correspond with the data
on the OMF, the order became an AUTONOM Reject. Whether the
orders were generated or rejected, AUTONOM provided OAIS
with a transaction tape on a daily basis. This tape was
used to update order status information with the date
transmitted in the case of order generation, or in the case
of order rejection, to pass the orders back up the automated
chop chain for further work.
The MPN Financial Management System (MFS) tape was
generated during AUTONOM processing. The MFS tape contained
projected order costs for training and travel by individual
SSN. This tape was sent to Naval Finance Center Cleveland
on a daily basis by NMPC-16 and hard copy was provided to
NMPC-7 for verification.
The Order Production Module (OPM) took the place of
AUTONOM in May 1987. The OPM was managed by NMPC-47 through
the Scheduling Shop. The OPM was originally designed for
use with the Enlisted Assignment Information System, but was
used with OAIS when a common order format was agreed upon
between officer and enlisted distribution communities.
The Navy Manpower Data Accounting System (NMDAS) is
managed by OP-01. Information concerning organizational
manning totals, personnel and billet authorizations, and
billet phasing dates is contained within NMDAS. Weekly
changes to the database were provided via magnetic tape to
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OAIS. These changes were of significant importance in
assigning officers.
The Officer Fitness Report File (FITREP) is the
responsibility of NMPC-3 and operated by NMPC-16. Condensed
statistical fitness report information by individual Social
Security Number (SSN) is contained in this system. Twice a
month, updates from this system were provided to OAIS.
The Automated Detailing Instruction System (ADIS) was
managed by NMPC-16. This system contained orderwriting and
specific detailing instructions for each Navy activity.
This information was updated in OAIS via magnetic tape twice
a month.
The Activity File was managed by the Enlisted Personnel
Management Center (EPMAC). Information such as accountable
Personnel Support Detachment Activities, Ship Deployment
Dates, Command phone numbers and addresses were provided for
each Naval activity. This information was updated once a
month before May 1987 and once a week after May 1987.
The Officer Candidate Accounting and Reporting System
(OCARS) was managed by NMPC-16. OCARS contained information
on Officer Candidates which was needed for initiating their
first set of orders. Information contained in this system
was obtained from the Naval Recruiting Command or the U.S.
Naval Academy. This information was updated in OAIS via
magnetic tape once a month.
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The Navy Information Training System (NITRAS) was the
responsibility of the Chief of Naval Education and Training
(CNET). Information pertaining to course schedules,
convening dates and course quotas was contained on this
system. Updates were provided to OAIS on a weekly basis.
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APPENDIX B
TIMELINES AND PERSONNEL LISTS
List of Personnel
October 1985 - May 1986
Name Position
Capt Williams N-47 Department Head
Cdr Rice N-470 Branch Head
Cdr Zeke Previous OAIS Project Officer
Cdr Cinder Previous N-471 Branch Head
Cdr Griffin N-471 Eranch Head
Cdr Hazel Previous Training Officer
N-472 Branch Head
Lt Hopkins OAIS Project Officer
Mr Smith Technical Director
Lt Perkins Training Officer
Lt Smith Error Research
DP1 Brown Application Programming
Figure 7. List of Personnel, October 1985-May 1986
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List of Personnel
May 86 - May 87
Name Position
Capt Williams N-47 Departmenl Head
Cdr Rice N-470 Branch Head
Lcdr Wall New N-470 Branch Head
Cdr Griffin N-471 Branch Head
Cdr Hazel N-472 Branch Head
Lt Hopkins OAIS Project Officer
Mr Smith Technical Director
Lt Perkins Training Officer
OAIS Help Desk
V. Hammer Sage Project Officer





Capt Hampton N47 Depart:,,nt Head
Lcdr Wall N470 Branch Hebd
Cdr Griffin N471 Branch Head
Car Hazel N472 Branch Head/OPM
m ir S itn Tecnnical Drirector
Lt Sanders OAIS Project Officer/Dev
LI Perkins OAIS Help Desk
Training
O IS Prole,"t Officer/ Prod
Ms. Green SYSCON Project Manager
Figure 9. List of Personnel, September 1987
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Timeline May 86 - August 86
Sav June July ugUS
7 .DAIS ! 7 " Contract Charge , OAIS Help DesK Concept
lmp:emented
, No USN Programming a Train ng Move
. SAGE Tears OAtS apart.
i n-nger Po'nting . LT HopkinS directives
Breakdown into modules
Test Plans
Figure 10. Timeline for May 1986-August 1986
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T imeline Sept 8 6 - Dec 8 6
ept Oct Nov Dec
H e! D esk * NMPDS Dial- , PACF Security Cacabilty
pre Log  Capabihty write P-
, Develop CAIS e~q a c ,rier-
* SGE req est •Expert Users' Test Plans
F"c:I ral US N ,.e., lews
, ert , Software Test P i.s
Co nver orI
POP H aze Problem o CC'S
Ce_:g2 n~ea En n.n:emen1
F nc Ion a I Announcement
E;" pert OAIS 1.7
avaiiable
March 1997
Figure 11. Timeline for September 1986-December 1986
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Timeline Jan 87 - April 87
Fen M arc h Apr
* ew Pro,!ect *FuHl Proluction AI 7
S AG E Control in N471 Testing
w it n~
a C me t.*Aforee Tekis c
rs to rY ay v e Y a.r,.-hS
for OAlS 1.7
* Systemn Stress implementation
Tests 1 & 2
,Capablity write
Petirernent Orders
Figure 12. Timeline for Jan ary 1987-April 1987
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Timeline May 87 - August 87
ay June July August
* OAIS 1. Lt Hopkins * SAGE lost * Official turnover
implemented back from contract to of OAIS/EAIS
leave SYSCON to SYSCON
* Crisis
Management , Notification , New Project
of Naval Officer for
* Ouick/Dirty Audit OAIS Develop
Fixes
Split contractor
* Lt Perkins resources between




Figure 13. Timeline for May 1987-August 1987
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-imeline Sept 87 - Nov 87
Sept Oct Nov Dec
* Capt Hampton * Policy of USN , New 472 Mission
re ieves personnel testing
Capt Williams software fixes * Data Admin and
Conf Mgt moved
* Activity File 0 CCB established to 472
Problem
. User Reps * Requirement
O CAIS vote on Analysis on
Development priority of OPM STR's
on hold STR/SCP
, Report Problems
* Prioritization , Training mandatory
of STR's , Standards for
, Order Support Run Books
* dAIS User moved to 471 and Naming
Meetings Conventions
Mandatory . Scheduling moved
Figure 14. Timeline for September 1987-December 1987
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